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 This dissertation concerns itself with poverty amongst the rural poor, and 
specifically with contributing to the set of tools and policies that can effectively 
improve their economic wellbeing.  Rural communities in developing countries play 
host to the majority of the world’s poor.  Widespread and persistent poverty has led to 
a growing appreciation of the unique set of obstacles limiting economic growth and 
progress in rural communities.  It is now widely accepted that economic behavior, 
especially in more traditional communities, is imbedded within a socio-cultural system 
that circumscribes the space of economic possibilities and outcomes.  The dominant 
view has it that the highly personalized nature of social interaction common to rural 
communities can be harnessed as productive ‘social capital’ to support economic 
interaction in the absence of formal market institutions. 
 The three papers of this dissertation aim to contribute to the existing literature 
on the social economics of development that goes beyond the myopic view of social 
capital as a productive input to economic endeavor.  They each emphasize the 
importance of a nuanced, context-specific understanding of how the set of shared 
norms, behaviors and expectations characteristic of rural environments interact and co-
evolve with an emerging market economy.  In three different settings I demonstrate 
how the naïve and generalized application of social capital as a productive resource 
 limits welfare growth, supports ineffective institutions and promotes faulty policy 
instruments. 
 The first paper shows how spatially-varied returns to human capital that fuel 
migration may diminish the capacity of social capital to support informal contract 
enforcement.  The second paper demonstrates how microfinance institutions whose 
design relies on an inadequate characterization of social capital may actually erode the 
very social forces it hopes to exploit.  Finally, the third paper highlights how 
increasing material incentives coupled with a dysfunctional mix of informal 
institutions and formal regulations can breed rent-seeking that adversely affects the 
welfare and productivity of the majority of members in a producer organization.  
 The contribution of this dissertation is to cast a spotlight on how specific 
features of the socioeconomic landscape interact to jointly determine the space of 
economic outcomes and the trajectory of social change.  In doing so, it informs the 
design of appropriate policies and institutions that provides the rural poor with a level-
playing field and promotes the set of incentives crucial for effective economic 
transacting. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Setting the Stage 
 This dissertation concerns itself with poverty amongst the rural poor, and 
specifically with contributing to the set of tools and policies that can effectively 
improve their economic wellbeing.  The rural environment offers a unique challenge 
to development economists owing to the complex and multifaceted nature of the 
obstacles limiting economic growth and progress.  Rural communities in developing 
countries often lack formal institutions that have evolved over centuries of market-
based exchange to offer an effective enabling environment for modern economic 
activity.  For these traditional rural communities, increasing rural-urban interaction 
and the globalization of the economic playing-field have forced an accelerated 
integration of the traditional rural community with the modern economy. 
 The highly personalized nature of social organization, the lack of established 
market institutions, the strength of traditional norms and cultural ideology - all 
features common to rural communities - considerably complicate its transition to a 
market economy.  Consequently, the methodological framework and toolkit with 
which economic behavior and opportunity are examined must account for the socio-
cultural context that sets the stage for economic endeavor.  Economists, initially 
reluctant to acknowledge that the socio-culturally neutral conventional models of the 
dominant neoclassical framework are not well-suited to examining traditional rural 
economies, have slowly been shifting their stance. 
 The discipline of economics, dominated by its affiliation with the neoclassical 
paradigm whereby the economic exchanges of rational, utility-maximizing agents lead 
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to efficient market outcomes, has had a difficult time reconciling the stringent 
behavioral, informational and institutional demands of neoclassical assumptions with 
most real world situations in poor, rural communities.  While the elegant simplicity of 
neoclassical models often serve as a useful benchmark against which to study 
economic phenomenon and as a beacon to guide the design of efficient systems, their 
usefulness and the accuracy of their predictions diminishes as their assumptions lose 
validity.  In developing countries, and especially in rural areas, where preferences, 
social interaction, and the formal and informal institutions that underlie economic 
activity are still largely embedded in traditional norms of socialization, the 
deficiencies of the neoclassical model are most evident. 
 As such, an increasing pool of economists, particularly those concerned with 
the economics of development, are beginning to acknowledge the fundamental role 
that socioeconomic, cultural and institutional forces play in circumscribing the space 
of economic possibilities and determining economic outcomes.  A nascent but rapidly 
growing literature is gradually building consensus that socio-cultural dynamics matter 
to economic outcomes (See Barrett, 2005a; Durlauf and Young, 2001; and Platteau, 
2000 for excellent surveys). 
 The concept of “social capital”, initially introduced by sociologists James 
Coleman (1990) and Mark Granovetter (1973)  and economist Glenn Loury (1977), 
spawned a considerable literature that pioneered the integration of socio-cultural 
parameters into economic models.  In short, social capital highlights the productive 
value of tight-knit social networks common to rural communities, arguing that in the 
absence of formal institutions, they can be a valuable source of information and 
services and can support economic activity in the absence of formal market 
institutions.  The general point of departure has been to endow rural communities with 
a high degree of social embeddeness, where individual behavior and preferences are 
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largely influenced by generally accepted social norms.  Such communities are 
characterized by low information asymmetries whereby personal details are easily 
accessible and verifiable via dense social networks.  Consequently, maintaining social 
networks has considerable value to individuals in such environments. 
 Social capital has been used to explain numerous regularities of rural 
economies as well as to suggest or justify various policies grounded on the 
instrumental and intrinsic value of social networks or norms (Besley and Coate, 1995; 
Besley et al., 1993; Braverman and Guasch, 1984; Fafchamps, 1992; Stiglitz, 1990). 
The importance individuals ascribe to their social standing, for example,  allows for 
the credible threat of social sanctions to act as a powerful deterrent to contract default.  
In addition to the low informational asymmetries that make detecting malfeasance 
relatively inexpensive, informal contract enforcement offers rural habitants with 
access to information, credit, insurance, new technologies etc., that are imperfectly 
provided by markets or governments.  
 Informal financing, whereby collateral-free credit is offered to the poor on the 
principle of joint-liability of loans, is one crucial service that relies on high degrees of 
social embeddness to operate.  A burgeoning literature identifies several theories 
explaining the processes that make informal finance mechanisms feasible and 
successful (See Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999 and Morduch, 1999 for excellent 
reviews).  Most of these explanations rely fundamentally on the existence of strong 
personal ties to community norms that sustain nonopportunistic behavior and transmit 
personal information across the community network.  The explosion of rotating 
savings and credit organizations, microfinance institutions and other informal lending 
mechanisms in the past two decades are evidence of the influence social capital exerts 
beyond academia and into development practice. 
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 A natural and complementary extension of the positive role that social capital 
can play to stimulate rural economies fuels the promotion of local community groups 
and cooperatives as effective mechanisms to exploit social spillovers for the benefit of 
the poor (Couto and Guthrie, 1999; Craig and Mayo, 1995; Lyon, 2003; Narayan and 
Pritchett, 1997).  The development economics literature explains that beyond the 
benefits of scale economies, collective organization is effective because low 
information asymmetries, shared behavioral expectations, and the high personal value 
of social norms mitigate leakages due to moral hazard and adverse selection.  
Community organizations allow individuals with shared objectives to coordinate their 
actions, maximizing the collective benefits of their material and social resources, and 
minimizing transactions, search and input costs.   
 Though the social capital literature can largely be credited for demonstrating 
the various ways in which socio-cultural parameters critically affect economic 
outcomes and how social capital can be exploited to improve productivity, several key 
deficiencies exist in their approach.  Proponents of social capital have painted an 
overly optimistic picture of the economically productive value of social embeddness, 
often overlooking other critical features of social organization in rural communities 
that serve to stifle the entrepreneurial spirit and are anemic to growth and 
development.  A new strand of the literature identifies numerous instances in which 
adherence to social norms dampens economic progress, or where emerging economic 
opportunities erode traditional norms and shift the determinants of social status 
thereby weakening the returns to social capital (See Barrett 2005a  for an excellent 
survey).   
 Platteau (2000), for example, describes how egalitarian norms common to 
small, traditional societies generate powerful pressures against private wealth 
accumulation via the imposition of considerable social taxes on unacceptable levels of 
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individual material gain.  Ingrained cultural practices and spiritual affiliations may 
also thwart economic progress.  As Barrett (2005b) describes, the practice of 
famadihana, whereby Malagasy peasants spend considerable sums of money to 
exhume and reshroud dead ancestors every 3-5 years, makes it considerably more 
difficult for the poor to escape their condition of poverty.  Along with norms that 
require households to sacrifice cattle when a family member dies, these traditional 
practices consume a significant portion of household resources that precludes 
investment in productive assets which offer a pathway out of poverty.  The aim of this 
new wave of social economics literature, however, is not to argue that social 
embeddedness is always an obstacle to productivity.  Indeed, Barrett (2005b) offers a 
contrasting example in which weak social ties prevent communities from coordinating 
their activities so as to avert encroachment of the parasitic weed Striga whose nature 
of infestation requires collective action to control.   
 Rather, the new wave of research takes a richer more nuanced approach, 
viewing social systems and economic processes as jointly determined, each 
endogenously limiting or expanding the set of acceptable behaviors and available 
opportunities while also changing the cost and benefits associated with pursing the 
various options.  Increasing access to new livelihood options or the infiltration of 
novel goods and services may change perceptions of status or generate personal 
incentives for material gain incompatible with existing norms.  Depending on the 
configuration of shared beliefs and expectations, and the relative distribution of power 
among the likely beneficiaries of change, the emergence of new opportunities may 
ignite a process of social evolution that discards features of socialization not 
conducive to economic progress and embraces features that are.  Alternatively, as we 
have seen, strong ties to traditional norms may be impervious to economic incentives 
while weak social networks may forestall productivity enhancing coordination. 
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 How then can one distinguish between features of social organization that fuel 
productive economic exchange and those that dampen productivity?  What are the 
critical pathways by which social organization affects economic performance and 
vice-versa?  In what ways does socio-cultural context condition the set of effective 
policy instruments for poverty alleviation and development?  These and similar 
questions form the core of frontier research on the social economics of development; 
the common point of departure being the recognition that the social-economic 
dynamic is often complex and context-specific, requiring careful, methodical 
investigation to uncover. 
 The three papers of my dissertation aim to contribute to the existing literature 
on the social economics of development that goes beyond the myopic view of social 
capital as a productive input to economic endeavor.  In this sense, each of the three 
papers present a specific critique of the pioneering social capital literature.  In 
different contexts, all set in the rural environment, I show how a naïve reliance on 
social capital as a catalyst for growth can support poorly designed interventions (or 
preclude the implementation of effective policies) that slow or even reverse welfare 
gains associated with economic growth.  The papers highlight various channels 
through which certain social configurations generate perverse economic outcomes, 
and, conversely, how emerging economic opportunity can fundamentally alter social 
interactions. 
 
1.2 Summary of Chapters 
 The first chapter, Educational Investments in a Dual Economy, presents a 
simple two-period, dual economy model in which migration may affect the informal 
financing of educational investments.  Coauthored with Chris Barrett, John McPeak, 
and Cheryl Doss, we show how migration options resulting from spatially varied 
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returns to human capital choke off the informal finance on which poorer rural 
households may depend for long-term, lumpy investments like children’s education.  
Contract enforcement of informal financing mechanisms relies on the credible threat 
of social sanctions.  However, when borrowers migrate, they may sever community 
ties that no longer yield benefits and are costly to maintain.  As individuals discount 
the value of their social connection, sanctions lose their effectiveness.  Prospective 
rural lenders, aware of this, refuse to extend educational loans to children who may 
subsequently migrate.  Innately talented, but poor children are especially disfavored in 
this setting. 
 Educational Investments in a Dual Economy highlights the jointly determined 
trajectory of economic development, spatial integration and social change.  In a social 
economics analogy to the “Lucas critique”, it shows how expanding livelihood 
opportunities along with rising spatial mobility can fundamentally change the 
structural relationship between social interactions and economic activity.  The value of 
social capital is based on shared proximity and highly personalized relationships, the 
expectation of repeated interaction and a commonly accepted and respected chain of 
authority.  When formal education emerges as a claim to wealth and social prestige, 
and when the returns to education are spatially varied and trigger rational migration, 
allegiance to traditional norms of socialization, upon which the functioning of 
informal contracts depends, weakens. 
 The second chapter draws attention to a different feature of social networks 
that may render informal finance institutions ineffective.  Making Loans to Make 
Friends: Explaining the Dismal Financial Performance of Financial Service 
Associations, investigates the ways in which microfinance provision, an idea with 
great potential, can unravel and yield perverse outcomes that run counter to its stated 
objective.  The chapter presents a theoretical challenge to the notion that large 
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endowments of social capital, a common feature of small rural communities, induce 
inexpensive peer monitoring efforts that render jointly-liable contracts efficient.  It 
shows that a reliance on a specific set of assumed community characteristics that often 
do not adequately represent the incentive structure facing borrowers and lenders, 
grossly overestimates the efficiency of informal finance institutions.  In particular, by 
focusing on Financial Service Associations (FSAs), a specific form of microfinance 
institution, we show that the effectiveness of such institutions is very sensitive to the 
behavioral motivations of both clientele and provider, which are determined by the 
intersection of prevailing social norms and material incentives. 
 The insight of this chapter is to show how strong social ties can breed 
incentives that are counter-productive for the group at large.  Unlike canonical models 
that paint an overly optimistic picture of the potential of MFIs to thrive in traditional 
communities by exclusively highlighting their informational advantages, I introduce 
the common features of patronage and favor-peddling to explain the demonstrated 
dismal financial performance of FSAs in Kenya.  Where individuals known to be in 
positions of privilege will invite costly retribution from friends and neighbors if they 
neglect to share the benefits, or could provide favors that may yield future dividends, 
the advantages of low information asymmetries are likely to be dampened.  The irony 
is that the same high degree of socialization that confers informational advantages on 
traditional societies also breeds incentives for patronage and favor-peddling.   
 I focus on FSAs to highlight the key role that social behavioral influences play 
in determining the effectiveness of institution design.  The structure and design of 
FSAs make them particularly vulnerable to the influences of patronage and favor-
peddling.  The organizational structure of the FSA is such that a small, elected credit 
committee bears the full social cost of screening and rejecting applications, but only 
share in a fraction of the financial benefit, which is distributed across all members.  
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Consequently, the credit committee has incentives to relax their screening and 
enforcement intensity to the financial detriment of the organization. 
 The third and final chapter of my dissertation is titled Imperfections in 
Membership Based Organizations for the Poor: An Explanation for the Dismal 
Performance of Kenya’s Coffee Cooperatives.  In this chapter I focus on the informal 
and formal institutions that underlie the smallholder coffee sub-sector in Kenya to 
demonstrate how a nuanced understanding of the interplay between material 
incentives, sociopolitical landscape, and organizational and regulatory structure lead to 
predictable sub-optimal outcomes.  I model the susceptibility of Kenyan coffee 
cooperatives to capture by corrupt and opportunistic members and identify certain 
features of the underlying institutional environment that facilitates rent-seeking 
behavior.  The lack of a formal regulatory structure with credible enforcement 
mechanisms, the presence of informal electoral practices conducive to vote-buying, 
and the legal support for local monopsonies that facilitates exploitive pricing all 
contribute to the dismal performance of Kenya’s coffee cooperatives.  Using an 
original data set of more than 200 coffee farmers representing nine cooperatives, I find 
a statistically significant relationship between cooperatives empirically determined to 
be corrupt and high levels of technical inefficiency in coffee production among its 
members. 
 In this chapter, I show that despite the complexity that characterizes the 
confluence of social configuration and economic incentives, it is possible to identify 
the parameters that determine actions and outcomes.  This information can then guide 
the design of effective institutional frameworks tailored to nurture the desired 
outcomes within the socio-cultural context they operate. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2 EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN A DUAL ECONOMY1 
2.1 Introduction 
 The positive relationship between education and expected future income is 
well established (Schultz 1988, Psacharopoulos 1994, Strauss et al. 1995, Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1995).  Yet, despite clear evidence of strong returns to education, many 
communities exhibit low rates of educational attainment, especially in rural areas of 
the developing world (Singh 1992, Psacharopoulos 1994).  One reason for the 
apparent underinvestment in children's education is imperfect financial markets that 
ration poorer households out of the formal market for long-term loans.  As Loury 
(1981) showed, when formal financial markets fail, the logical consequence is not 
only underinvestment in education but also, derivatively, the propagation of poverty 
from one generation to the next.  Credit market failures, coupled with costly 
education, limit the poor’s ability to purchase optimal levels of education.  The 
relationship between education and income is thus reversed, generating a poverty trap 
whereby the poor attain low levels of education due to financial constraints and 
consequently earn low incomes.  
Why, however, don't informal financial markets spring up to fill the 
educational financing gap when formal markets fail?  Elaborate informal credit and 
insurance mechanisms exist between households, providing finance not available 
through formal financial institutions (Udry 1993, Townsend 1994, Besley 1995, 
Morduch 1995).  Given the high apparent returns to education and widespread 
                                                 
1 This chapter, co-authored with Christopher Barrett, John McPeak and Cheryl Doss, has been accepted 
for publication in the journal Economica and is forthcoming in 2006/2007. 
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anecdotal evidence of informal financing of others' education, one naturally wonders 
why informal financial transactions do not resolve the educational investment problem 
in rural areas of developing countries.   
This paper offers an answer to that puzzle.  We show that in the presence of 
financial market imperfections associated with imperfect credit contract enforcement, 
spatial variation in the returns to education can induce migration decisions that 
rationally choke off the informal financing of education in relatively disadvantaged 
areas. When financial markets are complete and perfect, spatially varied returns to 
human capital have no effect on educational investment patterns. But when formal 
financial markets are incomplete and credit contracts must be self-enforcing, spatial 
inequality in infrastructure and other attributes that increase the returns to education 
create spatial differentials in educational lending and, consequently, increase 
geographic and wealth-based variation in educational attainment.  
The important innovation of this paper is to link the literature on spatially 
varied productivity and migration with that on informal finance.  The extensive 
literature on migration emphasizes how spatially varied infrastructure, law 
enforcement, access to lucrative markets and other attributes creates a gradient across 
space in real returns to education (Stark 1984, Williamson 1988, Todaro 1997, 
Banerjee et al. 1998).  Educated persons living in relatively disadvantaged rural areas 
with few opportunities for skilled employment find that migration is an especially 
attractive option (Barnum and Sabot 1975, Schultz 1988).  A consistent finding in this 
literature is of the positive relationship between educational attainment and rural-
urban migration (Todaro, 1997).   
On the other hand, the literature on informal finance identifies the close-knit 
associations of traditional communities as the ‘social capital’ that allows for the 
informal provision of financial services (Stiglitz 1991, Besley et al. 1993).  Lenders 
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can access relatively cheap information on potential borrowers due to highly 
personalized intra-community relationships.  They can also assure repayment by the 
credible threat of social sanctions: a borrower who is visibly able to pay but neglects 
his loan commitment will signal dishonesty, thereby eroding his stock of social capital 
within the community.   
Contract enforcement, however, becomes more difficult the farther the 
contracting parties are from each other.  Tracking down debtors becomes costly and 
the threat of social sanctions loses some of its power as their interaction with the 
community is diminished.  Prospective rural lenders would thus consider borrowers’ 
migration options when deciding whether to extend educational loans. Put differently, 
informal financial market equilibria depend on migration incentives.  As a 
consequence, an increase in the spatial differential in the returns to human capital may 
choke off informal financing of education in rural areas as lenders increasingly expect 
borrowers to migrate, making them greater risks for default. In this paper, we develop 
a theoretical model that demonstrates this explanation for the apparent 
underinvestment in rural education. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 builds the general 
structure of a simple two-period, dual economy model that parsimoniously captures 
the essence of the problem.  In section 2.3, we explore the implications of the model 
for patterns of educational investment and migration and examine the inefficiencies 
resulting from credit conditions that deviate from the first best world.  Section 2.4 
discusses the policy implications of our findings and concludes. 
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2.2  The Model 
 Consider a two period dual economy.  In period one, the adult household head 
makes educational investments in the children in the community (no one invests in 
children outside their own community).  Then, in period two, the (now grown) 
children decide where to live and work conditional on the their human capital 
accumulated in period one.   
The economy consists of two locations: A rural area with weak productive 
infrastructure that represents a more traditional mode of production and an urban area 
with better communications, power, transport and public services that underpin 
modern industrial and service economies. As such, returns to education are higher in 
the urban area.  We treat the differences in productive infrastructure across locations 
as exogenous and assume that human capital productivity is increasing in 
infrastructure.  This spatial variation in the returns to education generates incentives to 
migrate and geographic variation in private investments in education, especially in the 
absence of perfect credit contract enforcement.2 
Assume there are Nj ,...,1=  households in the rural village, each with one 
adult decision maker and one child. Each adult decision maker is endowed with 
wealth jw and each child is endowed with a random assignment of innate ability jα , 
where ].1,0[∈α  We assume that the distribution of abilities across children in the 
village is common knowledge.3  In period one, adults choose whether to educate their 
                                                 
2 We focus on the rural economy and use the urban area only as a magnet for migrant laborers from the 
village.  In our framework, it would never be rational for an urban dweller to migrate to the rural area, 
given the decreased return on their human capital that would result. 
3 By this assumption, we evoke a rural village with low informational asymmetries arising from the 
high degree of socialization common in traditional communities.  Similar assumptions are standard in 
the large literature on rural traditional economies.  See Platteau (2000) for an excellent review. 
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own children, invest in the education of other children in the village at a given net 
interest rate r, or hold their wealth in the form of a composite, alternative asset that 
pays marginally less than r.4  At the outset of period two, each grown child decides 
where to live and work.  
We are mainly concerned with demonstrating how migration induced by 
spatial differences in the returns to education leads to rural underinvestment in 
education, especially for children with high latent ability, by hindering informal 
finance mechanisms.  Thus, we make some strong simplifying assumptions.  
Following Banerjee and Newman (1998), we assume that once individuals migrate, 
they free themselves entirely of their obligations to non-kin in their original, rural 
community.  This assumed distinction between kin and non-kin derives from an 
observed, qualitative difference between taking advantage of distance and relative 
anonymity to default on informal loans provided by non-kin community members and 
the breaking of ties or responsibility to family.  In a comprehensive survey of the 
relevant literature, Remple and Lobdell (1978) find that a substantial majority of urban 
remittances go to the household of the migrant. Village elders are the only non-kin that 
receive a significant share of remittances.  We incorporate this distinction by modeling 
households as receiving benefits from their own child’s income whether or not the 
child migrates.5 
                                                 
4 This composite alternative asset serves just as a benchmark against which educational investments are 
measured.  Setting the returns to this asset at marginally less than r is a simplifying assumption 
allowing us to focus on a household’s educational investments.  The implication that the returns to 
education dominate the returns to other available investment options does not undermine our model.  
Rather, it simply underscores the puzzle this paper investigates: Given empirical evidence of high 
returns to education (Psacharoupoulos, 1994), what explains the apparent underinvestment in education 
that often characterizes rural communities? 
5 Non-family community members can assure returns to their investment by tracking down emigrants in 
urban areas and demanding repayment or reciprocity, such as using their home as a base for developing 
their own ties in the urban area.  While emigrants might default on their loan commitment, it is more 
difficult for them to completely escape traditional norms that call for hospitality and the provision of 
food and shelter to natal community members who request it.  In this way, emigrants can act as 
‘beachheads’ for the rural community, establishing a foundation that facilitates greater rural-urban 
interaction.  By utilizing emigrants for this purpose, natal community lenders can recoup some of their 
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2.2.1 The Child’s Migration Decision 
We follow the standard solution technique of backward recursion, solving the 
child’s period two migration decision first, then solving the adults’ first period 
educational investment decision conditional on the child’s subsequent best response.  
Let ],...[ 1 Njjj EEE ≡  be the vector of educational units provided to each child 
],...,1[ Ni = in the community by household j , and ],...[ 1 jNjj EEE ≡ be the vector of 
all educational units received by child j from each household ],...,1[ Ni = .  Note that 
the first subscript indexes the recipient (child) and the second the financier 
(household). 
To simplify notation and make the model more analytically tractable, we do 
not attempt to analyze complex exchanges that allow any households to offer 
education loans to specific non-kin children in the community.  Instead, we model a 
community fund financed by the contribution of households wishing to invest in the 
education of community children.  Any child from the community can then apply for 
educational funds from this community pot.6  We can now write ][ cjjjj EEE +≡  and 
][ jcjj
j EEE +≡  where cjE denotes household j’s contribution to the community pot 
and jcE represents that portion of child j’s education financed through community 
funding. 
                                                                                                                                            
otherwise lost investment.  But while lenders can tap into the benefits emigrants provide to recover part 
of their loans, the ‘beachhead’ effect alone does not alter a potential lender’s loan decision ex ante 
because community norms generally require the emigrant to oblige any natal community member who 
requires assistance in the city, not just those who have extended him credit in the past.  So long as 
emigrants cannot exclude any community members from assistance, then each potential lender in the 
rural community has an incentive to free ride on the ‘beachhead’ opportunity sponsored by some other 
lender since the service is non-exclusive. In the interests of simplicity, we therefore assume away 
‘beachhead’ effects in our model, as they do not affect the qualitative results. 
 
6 As the return on educational investments is set at (1+r) and is thus independent of the child, and as 
children are similarly indifferent as to who in the community provides the loans, our qualitative results 
are robust to this simplifying abstraction. 
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Let jjj Eh α=  be the level of human capital attained by child j. The labor 
productivity of a child with human capital jh is then given by the strictly concave, 
monotone and twice differentiable function )( jhρ . An individual whose productivity 
is )(hρ in the village has an increased productivity level )(hλρ in the city, where 
1>λ  and reflecting the higher returns to human capital in urban areas. 
In the event that a parent’s wealth is insufficient to cover their optimal level of 
education, a child may seek educational loans in period one from the community.  In 
the absence of credit markets with perfect, exogenous contract enforcement, children 
are able to  renege on these loans in period two.  For the sake of simplicity in the 
model, we assume that the child tries to renege on any loans received from the 
community if and only if he migrates to the city.  The lenders can respond and, 
following Banerjee and Newman (1998), we model their retribution as the power to 
seize the full value of a migrated child’s income if they are caught.7  We denote as 
π−1  the probability of catching a reneging child.  Educated children will rationally 
migrate and renege on their educational loan contracts when there is significant spatial 
variation in the returns to education λ , the costs of migration c are low and 
enforcement of loan contracts is weak (i.e,π  is high).   
Suppose that, in the second period, a child with human capital jh remains in 
the village.  His net earnings will then be )( jhρ - jcE EPr)1( +  where r is the net 
interest rate and EP is the cost of a unit of education.
8  Should the child decide to 
migrate, his expected gross earnings will be )( jhπλρ  and he incurs a migration cost, 
                                                 
7 By driving a defaulter’s income to zero, no lender would ever fund a migrating child so informal 
finance flows only to non-migrating children.  Our main aim, to show that migration options reduce the 
loan pool for education, is robust to this simplifying assumption.   
8 A child does not have to explicitly repay education financed by his parents.  This allows for an adult’s 
decisions on their children’s education to involve additional considerations beyond merely material 
investment returns.  
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c.9  The migration cost c incorporates both the financial costs of relocation as well as 
the social costs that result from a loss of social relationships that may be intrinsically 
as well as instrumentally important.  The child’s second period choice is thus quite 
simple:  
Max ( jcEj EPrh )1()( +−ρ , )()( jjc hE λρπ - c)      (1) 
 
Where     ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =
>=
0if1
0if
)(
jc
jc
jc E
E
E
ππ 10 
Adults invest in their community’s children with full knowledge that their investment 
decisions will eventually affect the child’s migration decision. 
2.2.2 Adult’s Investment Decision  
 All the adults in the village can observe each child’s innate ability by the time 
they need to make educational investments.11  In deciding how to allocate education 
investments between their own child and other children in the community, an adult 
considers the returns to each investment option, taking the children’s migration 
decisions into consideration. The adult household head’s first period decision problem 
can then be characterized by 
cjjj EE
Max
,  jcjEcjjjEj YEPrEEPw δβδ ++++− )1()(         ]1,0(),1,0( ∈∈ βδ  
     (2)  
                                                 
9 Note that in equating productivity with wages, we implicitly assume a competitive labor market where 
firms hire labor up to the point where the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate. 
 
10 Defining )( jcEπ in this manner captures the fact that the probability of being caught and punished is 
only relevant when the child received a positive amount of education loans from the community pot on 
which he can renege. 
11 As primary education is often free or subsidized, the need for educational investments arises mainly 
at the secondary level and beyond, making this a tenable assumption. 
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subject to: Yj = Max ( )( jhρ - jcE EPr)1( + , )( jhλρ - c)            (3) 
  jcjjjE wEEP ≤+ )(                                          (4) 
  cjiicEi EchEPrh ])()()1()([ +−+− πλρρ  ≥  0  ji ≠∀                 (5) 
where δ is a discount factor reflecting current valuation of future earnings.  Note that a 
household’s expenditure on the education of its own child indirectly affects its well 
being via the function Yδβ . The household’s utility increases in its child’s future 
productivity given by equation (3).  β  captures the household’s valuation of their 
child’s future income12.  The function Yδβ  flexibly accounts for parental investments 
in their children’s education due to any combination of material and nonmaterial (e.g., 
altruistic, status) purposes. Equation (4) is a budget constraint. 
The optimal investments are intuitive.  Households will invest in their own 
child as long as the increase in their well being resulting from a marginal gain in their 
child’s productivity exceeds the opportunity cost of investing in another child from the 
community. An adult will only invest in a child from another household within the 
community if that child will repay his loan.  This creates an incentive compatibility 
constraint (ICC), reflected in equation (5), such that all children receiving educational 
loans will not be educated beyond the point at which they would rationally migrate to 
the city and subsequently default on the loan.   
As we will show, the incentive compatible level of education depends 
fundamentally on the spatial variation in returns to education, λ, the cost of migration, 
c, the child’s intrinsic ability, α, and the enforcement of loan contracts as reflected in 
the probability that one can successfully renege on contracts by moving, represented 
                                                 
12 The Rotten Kid Theorem (Becker, 1974), which states that in the presence of parental transfers even a 
selfish child will choose actions that maximize the income of the family, suggests setting 1=β .  
However, as transfers are made in the first stage and the parent does not have control of the child’s 
second period earnings (as they do under the assumptions of the Rotten Kid Theorem), we opt to set 
]1,0(∈β , allowing for the utility parents derive from their child’s earnings to vary. 
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by π.  The ICC for the optimization problem reflects the fact that if household j does 
not provide any funding for the education of child i≠ j, then it is indifferent to child i’s 
decision to migrate.  Households may want their own children to migrate after they are 
educated, but if they have invested in others’ children’s education, they do not want 
those children to leave. 
 
2.3 Analysis 
 We now analyze the factors that affect the educational outcomes of children 
and the educational investment decisions taken by adults. Specifically, we investigate 
how various educational financing schemes affect the optimal education levels in a 
dual economy setting and how educational investments vary in response to changes in 
the model’s parameters.  
To establish a basis for comparison, we first analyze the case in which children 
only receive educational funding from their own parents and characterize the 
conditions for migration and the optimal levels of education in each sector.  We then 
allow children to receive informal loans from other households.  We show that the 
presence of an informal credit market weakly increases the educational attainment of 
all children but its efficiency is decreasing in the rate of out-migration.  Finally, we 
briefly consider the case of a first-best world, where children can borrow on their 
future productivity from a formal credit market to finance their education. These 
comparisons show how informal credit markets can break down in the presence of 
migratory pressures, leading to underinvestment in education, especially among high 
ability children from poor households. 
2.3.1 Household-Funded Education 
 In this first scenario, a child’s  education can only be funded by his or her  own 
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household, so there is no education loan market.  
2.3.1.1 The Child’s Decision 
 We begin by studying the child’s problem.  The human capital of a child j 
whose education is only funded by his own household j is given by jjjj Eh α= .  From 
(1) we know that he will migrate if his total level of human capital jh implies 
     chh jj ≥− )()( ρλρ                           (6) 
Let ),( ch λ denote the level of jh that solves equation (6) with equality.  This is the 
threshold level of human capital necessary to migrate.  Given that (.)ρ is strictly 
concave and monotonically increasing, we can apply the inverse-function theorem to 
establish: 
       0)()( <∂∂ λh                                       (7) 
and      0)()( >∂∂ ch                                        (8) 
Condition (7) says that as the urban/rural infrastructure ratio increases, the 
human capital threshold level decreases and thus more people are likely to migrate.  
Indeed, both within and across nations, actual migration patterns are overwhelmingly 
toward higher productivity regions.  Condition (8) simply indicates that as the cost of 
migration increases, the level of human capital required to migrate also increases. This 
wedge creates some modest, but bounded, spatial differences in incentives to invest in 
education.   
  Furthermore, since Eh α= , the threshold level of education needed to induce 
migration hE =)(αα , is decreasing in natural ability:  
    0)())(( <∂∂ ααE                  (9) 
Thus, everything else equal, high potential individuals are more likely to attain the 
threshold level and migrate, as reflected in “the brain drain” literature (Stark, 1984, 
1999, Masson, 2001, Commander et al. 2003).  
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2.3.1.2 Household Head’s Decision 
 We now analyze the adult or household head’s first period problem. We first 
characterize the conditions under which an adult will spend all of her wealth on the 
education of her own child.  
 Suppose, child j migrates in period 2, i.e., the household invests at least jE in 
period 1. Then, it must have been the case in period one  that: 
    jjE wEP ≤       (10)   
 and  Ejjjj PrE )1()( +≥′ δααρδβλ  for jjj EE ≥         (11) 
Put differently, a child will migrate if and only if his parents were both able and 
willing to provide the child with a level of education that meets or exceeds the 
threshold level required for migration.  Equations (10) and (11) reflect these 
conditions.  Equation (10) sets down the minimum household wealth necessary to 
make such an investment feasible.  Furthermore, as specified in (11), an adult will 
continue to invest in her migrating child’s education as long as the marginal benefit to 
the household is larger or equal to the opportunity cost. We define
u
jE as the value that 
solves (11) with equality. 
u
jE is thus household j’s optimal level of educational 
investment in their child, conditional on anticipating (correctly) that the child will 
migrate. j
u
j EE ≥  is a necessary condition for migration to occur. 
 For ease of reference, Table 2.1 contains the definitions for key model 
variables. 
 
  24
Table 2.1:  Glossary of Key Model Variables 
Variable Definition 
jjE  Amount of a child j’s education purely funded by his parents (household j) 
cjE  Amount of educational units that household j invests in non-kin community children 
jcE  Amount of child j’s education financed by community funds 
jE  jcjj EE +≡ , the total education attained by child j 
jE  cjjj EE +≡ , the total amount of education financed by household j 
jE  Threshold level of education needed to make migration rational for child j 
j
u
E  Level of education demanded for a child j who will migrate to the urban area.  
j
r
E  Level of education demanded for a child j who will remain in the rural area 
jc
s
E  Maximum amount of education that the community will finance for a child j 
cj
d
E  Amount of education for which a child j requires community funding.  
 
If instead the child does not migrate in period 2, then it must have been the 
case in period one that either jj ww ≤  or j
u
j EE < or both. If either condition holds, 
the adult head continues to spend on her child so long as jjE  satisfies 
  Ejjjj PrE )1()( +≥′ δααρδβ  where  jjj EE <             (12) 
This condition assures that at the level of education that exhausts the 
household’s wealth, the marginal benefit to the household from an increase in the non-
migrating child’s education is greater than the opportunity cost of investing in 
alternative options.  Let j
r
E  solve (12) with equality, representing household j’s 
optimal level of education given that child j is unable to migrate in the subsequent 
period.13 
It is now a simple task to classify the set of children who will migrate if they 
have no recourse to extra-household education loans to finance their education.  Given 
the set of community-specific parameters,λ , r and c, a child’s migration decision 
                                                 
13 A child j will not migrate if his parents are wealth constrained ( jj ww < ), he is ability constrained 
( jj
u
EE < ), or both. 
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depends entirely on his innate ability and the level of his household’s wealth.  Intra-
community variation in migration and education patterns thus arises due to cross-
sectional variation in initial endowments.  The strict concavity of (.)ρ makes the LHS 
of equation (12) decreasing in E.  Because the threshold level of education, E , is 
decreasing in α , per equation (9), at low levels of innate ability α , E  exceeds the 
optimal level of education for children who will migrate, 
u
E . Let Mα  establish the 
ability threshold that determines which children migrate irrespective of household 
wealth, i.e.,
u
M EE =)(α .  Figure 2.1 graphs the combination of parental educational 
investments and innate abilities that jointly determine a child’s educational attainment 
and subsequent locational choice in the second period conditional on λ and c.   
αMα0
E
r
E
u
E
E
E
1  
Figure 2.1:  Educational Outcomes and Migration Level Conditioned on Child 
Intelligence and Household Wealth 
 
Consider first the
r
E schedule obtained from equation (12).  It represents the 
maximum educational level an adult will “invest” in her child if he stays in the rural 
area.  The 
u
E  schedule, implied by equation (11), has a similar interpretation, but for 
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children who migrate.  As returns to education are higher in the city, this schedule 
strictly dominates the former.  Both schedules represent the upper limits of potential 
education.  Which schedule is relevant depends on household wealth and the child’s 
ability.  Children whose parents can afford to provide them with a level of education 
above the threshold (given by the curve E corresponding to equation (6)) migrate; the 
others stay home.  For a child with Mαα < , the threshold level of education needed to 
make migration rational exceeds the maximum investment his parent would be willing 
to make in his education, irrespective of her wealth.  These children are ability-
constrained and will never migrate. Children with Mαα ≥ will migrate only if their 
parents can afford the threshold level of education, i.e., )(αEPw E≥ .  The shaded area 
in Figure 2.1 thus represents the space of children who meet the conditions for 
migration. Assuming the distribution of innate ability is independent of household 
wealth, there will be some children with high ability who fall far short of their optimal 
level of education due to low household wealth.  Conversely, wealthy households will 
educate their low ability children up to the optimal level. Without access to extra-
household educational financing,  poverty thereby gives rise to lower levels of 
educational attainment and inefficiencies in the allocation of education across children 
of heterogeneous ability. 
2.3.1.3 The effect of spatial variation in productivity on education levels 
 Suppose the urban sector underwent a period of heavy investment in its 
infrastructure, resulting in a relative increase in urban labor productivity.  Per equation 
(11), an increase inλ  raises the marginal benefit of human capital thus resulting in 
higher 
u
E  for all levels of α .  Consequently, the threshold level of h  drops and, for 
any given α , so does E and therefore w .   Since uM EE =α , a decrease in h  and an 
increase in 
u
E imply a decrease in Mα .  Thus 0>∀α  
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0)()( >∂∂ λuE                                                 (13)   
and            0)()( <∂∂ λE                         (14) 
Figure 2.2 graphically depicts the effect of increasing urban productivity on 
educational outcomes and migration rates.   
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Figure 2.2:  Effect of Increasing Urban Productivity on Educational Outcome and 
Migration Rate 
 
As equations (13) and (11) indicate, an increase in λ pivots uEO  counter 
clockwise and shifts E down causing Mα  to fall from M0α  to M1α .  The result is an 
increase in migration if there exists at least one household j such that:  
0Ew jj α<  and 1Ew jj α>                           (15) 
Condition (15) corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 2. It represents all 
those children for whom an increase inλ lifted wealth and/or ability constraints 
enough to make migration attractive.  Note that even though their level of education 
remains the same, they now migrate and thus earn higher wages for any given level of 
human capital.  There will, however, still be those children whose ability and/or 
household wealth endowment is too low to migrate. Household poverty can result in a 
large differences between a child’s optimal level of education and the actual amount of 
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education they receive. The extent of this disparity, which increases with increasing 
spatial differences in labor productivity, is bound by the range 
u
jE ],0[ .  This range 
collapses toward j
u
E  (toward 
r
jE for 
M
j αα < ) as household wealth increases, and, as 
is clear in Figure 2, is increasing in α .  Moreover, asλ  increases, the difference in 
optimal educational level between a child who chooses to stay in the rural area and 
one who migrates  (for any given level of α ) increases. That is, 0)()( >∂−∂ λru EE .  
Conversely, a decrease inλ ,due to improvements in rural infrastructure that increases 
its relative productivity, would reduce the educational investment gap.  This reflects 
the well known phenomenon that as urban centers develop more quickly than outlying 
rural areas, the socio-economic disparity between urban elites and rural elites grows, 
reflected here in terms of higher incentives to educational attainment for rural children 
who expect to migrate.  This does not mean that all, or even most of the urban 
immigrants achieve this level of education. Indeed, increased relative productivity in 
the urban area increases the rate of migration by loosening the lower boundaries on the 
ability and wealth constraints. This means that the urban area begins to attract both 
relatively more skill-poor individuals and those coming from low wealth households. 
It is therefore safe to conjecture that such a dynamic not only increases the urban-rural 
polarization but also results in increasing inequality within the urban sector. In a 
growth model characterized by ability-biased technological transition, Galor and 
Moav (2000) show that increases in the rate of technological progress result in 
increasing wage inequality both between and within groups of skilled and unskilled 
workers.  Assuming an urban bias in growth processes, it should be feasible to 
replicate similar results in a dynamic version of our model.  We leave this topic for 
future extensions of the model.   
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2.3.2 Informal Credit Market 
Thus far we have restricted our attention to the case in which a child’s 
education is financed solely by its own household.  This establishes a benchmark 
against which we now explore the relationship between spatial variation in the returns 
to human capital and the financing of educational investments.  We start by analyzing 
the household’s decision to invest in other children. 
2.3.2.1 The Supply of Community Funded Education 
 We first characterize the conditions under which educational loans can be be 
provided to children outside of the lender’s household.  In order for the community to 
invest in child j, i.e., 0>jcE , it must be the case that  
jcEjcjjjjcjjj EPrcEEEE )1())(())(( +−≤+−+ αραπλρ      (16) 
This condition assures the lending household(s) that the recipient child will not 
migrate and thus renege on his loan.  Let 
s
jcE solve (16) with equality. 
s
jcE then 
represents the maximum amount of educational loans the community will supply child 
j.14  Allowing educational loans shifts the migration threshold since migration 
effectively generates windfall earnings in the form of loan non-repayments.  With 
lower risks of being caught and larger loans, the community lending constraint will be 
tighter as lenders adjust for the increased attractiveness of migration. 
To provide a clear picture of the determinants of 
s
jcE , we graph condition (16) 
in Figure 2.3 and analyze the comparative statics with respect to a shift in the model’s 
parameters.   
 
                                                 
14 Note that the supply of loans 
s
jcE for a child j is calculated after household j decides how much to 
invest in its own child’s education, jjE , independently from lending or borrowing options. Then, 
starting from the optimal educational expenses provided by the household, informal (or formal) lending 
may take place. 
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Figure 2.3:  Determinants of Maximum Level of Community Financed Education 
 
Recall that the right-hand side of condition (16) captures the net cost of 
migration. When 0=jcE , the net cost is constant, as in the model without any 
educational loans. As a child takes out educational loans, i.e., jcE  increases, the net 
cost of migration decreases at the rate EPr)1( +  as migrating now induces windfall 
gains from default on the loans. The left-hand side of condition (16) crosses the 
vertical axis below c.15  Since both functions are strictly concave, and thus their 
difference is also strictly concave, then for any given jjE , )()1(
j
j Eαρπλ −  is 
increasing in jcE .  
s
jcE reflects the loan value where the child is indifferent between 
staying and repaying his loans or migrating and defaulting, and thus represents the 
maximal supply of community-financed education.  
Recall that π  denotes the probability that a child escapes attempts by the 
community to punish him for defaulting on his loans.  For large π , migrants find it 
relatively easy to avoid punishment. A rural household with surplus investible 
                                                 
15 We know that 0>jcE implies that jjj EE < .  Thus, since jE is such that 
( ,)()1( cEjj =− αρλ then for 0=jcE and )1,0(∈π , it follows that 
cEEj jcjj <+− )(()1( αρλπ . 
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resources will rationally seek to protect itself from potentially bad investments.  As 
Figure 2.4 shows, because an increase in π  shifts up the expected gain of migrating, it 
lowers
s
jcE , reducing the supply of informal educational loans available to child j.  
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Figure 2.4:  Response of Community Financed Education to Increases in Urban 
Productivity and Ease of Default 
 
Figure 2.4 similarly shows the decrease in 
s
jcE  resulting from an increase inλ . 
Again, this is merely the rational response of adults protecting their investments in the 
face of an increased incentive for educated children to migrate.  On the other hand, in 
a community with strong social networks and in which personal welfare is inextricably 
linked to social status, the resulting increase in the cost of moving is likely to relax this  
constraint of loan provision. These outcomes highlight our central result. As the 
expected benefit of migration increases for an educated child, the supply of 
community-financed educational loans decreases.  That is, 0)()( <∂∂ λsjcE , 
0)()( <∂∂ πsjcE , 0)()( >∂∂ cE
s
jc .  Thus, the more attractive the migration option, 
the more the initial wealth of the child’s household conditions its educational 
attainment.   
The return on educational investment is given by )1( r+ . One would expect 
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increases in investment returns to increase
s
jcE .  However, a higher return to 
investment implies a larger debt burden per unit of education financed for the child, 
which increases his incentive to migrate and default.  As such, increases in the net  
return on educational investment, r, actually decrease
s
jcE , the maximum level of 
education the community is willing to invest in any child j.  That is, 0)()( <∂∂ rEsjc .  
Figure 2.5 shows this result. An increase in r represents a steeper slope on the net cost 
to migration curve which then intersects the expected net gain to migration curve at a 
lower 
s
jcE . 
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Figure 2.5:  Response of Community Funded Education to Decreases in Costs of 
Migration 
 
2.3.2.2 The Demand for Community Funded Education 
As a result of the fixed rate of repayment )1( r+  that an investor receives per 
unit of education financed, the investor may be willing to invest in a child beyond the 
level that optimizes the child’s productivity.  However, the child (or his parent, acting 
on his behalf) will reject all loans whose repayment cost exceeds the resulting 
productivity increase.  Recall that j
r
E  was child j’s optimal level of education if he 
stayed in the rural area and only his parent financed his education.  We now establish 
the child’s demand for community-provided educational loans to supplement parental 
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financing. Given the level of education provided by his own household, jjE , child j 
will accept any level of community funded educational units jcE  that satisfies  
   Ejjcjjj PrEE )1())(( +≥+′ ααρ                 (17) 
 Let 
d
jcE solve (17) with equality, denoting child j’s optimal demand for 
education loans.  If community willingness to lend to child j is at least as large as the 
child’s demand for education, i.e.  
d
jc
s
jc EE ≥ , then child j’s total educational 
attainment will be
d
jcjj EE + and will not be constrained by the contractual demands of 
the informal credit market structure.  If on the other hand
d
jc
s
jc EE < , then the child will 
receive a total education of 
s
jcjj EE + , the amount funded by his household and 
community loans.  Note that from equations (12) and (17) we have that 
         Ej
r
jj PrE )1()( +=′ ααρβ                    (18) 
and                     Ej
d
jcjjj PrEE )1())(( +=+′ ααρ                (19) 
it follows that 
      
d
jcjjj
r
EEE +≤                         (20) 
Thus, for any child j who does not migrate, 0≥djcE  and they demand a weakly 
positive level of community funded education (strictly positive 1<∀β ).16  This is true 
because while a child absorbs the full return from increased productivity resulting 
from additional education, the ensuing indirect increase in the household’s utility is 
discounted by β .  Whether a child’s educational attainment is constrained by the 
community supply of education loans or by the child’s demand for education loans 
depends on the child’s ability and his household’s wealth.  Any child who seeks an 
                                                 
16 One can prove this as follows. 1<∀β , equations (18) and (19) imply that 
r
d
jcjjj EEE +<   
Suppose 0=djcE .  Equation (20) then implies that jjj
r
EE < .  This is a contradiction since, given 
that the optimal level of household funded rural education is j
r
E , it must be that .j
r
jj EE ≤   It 
follows that .0>jcdE  For 1=β , 0=djcE iff 
r
jEj EPw ≥ . 
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education level that would make migration a rational second-period decision will be 
constrained by the limited community education loans available to him.  Unlike the 
household-only funding scenario in which any child with Mα≤α  would never 
migrate, that threshold falls to zero in the presence of lending because for large 
enough loan values the benefit of migrating and defaulting becomes irresistible.  
Migration becomes more inviting as the probability of getting caught 
)1( π− decreases, the marginal cost of education EPr)1( +  increases, and the personal 
return to education, α , increases. sjcE is thus decreasing in jα , though even with 
1j =α , a child j will always have access to a positive supply of community loans.17 
Meanwhile, a child’s demand for education, and thus for educational loans, is 
monotonically increasing in α .  Figure 2.6 depicts the demand and supply of 
community education as a function of α . 
 
 
                                                 
17 This result follows from the definition of jE  and 
s
jcE .  jE  is such that c)E()1( jj =αρ−λ  and 
s
jcE  solves 
s
jcE
s
jcjj EPrcEE )1())(()1( +−=+− αρλπ .  Let 1j =α  and ).1,0(∈π  
Suppose 0=sjcE , this implies that cE jj =− )()1( αρλ , and cE jj =− )()1( αρλπ .  This is a 
contradiction and thus.
s
jcE 0> . 
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Figure 2.6:  Demand and Supply of Community Funded Education 
 
The bold sections of the demand and supply schedules represent the education 
loans child j receives in equilibrium.  All those children with *α≤α will receive their 
optimal level of education while children with *α>α  will be constrained by the 
amount of loan the community is willing to finance.18 The striking implication is that 
with imperfectly enforceable credit contracts and migration options, children are 
implicitly punished for being born intelligent.  High innate ability increases the 
benefits to migration, inducing rational investors to limit loans as a defense against 
default.  This also results in an inefficient allocation of educational opportunities.  
Ceteris paribus, low ability children who generate less productivity from a given level 
of education receive more funding and thus more education.  
Moreover, since education loans are decreasing in child innate ability beyond 
some point *α , high ability children will depend disproportionately on their parent’s 
wealth to finance their education.  For wealthy households, the imperfect 
enforceability of informal lending contracts will not constrain the child’s educational 
                                                 
18 The low-density exception are children of households whose wealth and resulting investment choices 
bring the child nearly to the migration threshold, but a single unit of community-financed education 
would provide education sufficient to make it worth the child’s while to migrate. 
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attainment and adult earning prospects (see Figure 1).  But for poor households, the 
constrained supply of educational loans limits opportunities.   
We modeled an unconstrained community education lending fund, one that is 
always capable of meeting the demand for loans, i.e. ∑ ∑
= =
≥N
ij
N
j
d
jccj EE
1
, subject only to 
the incentive compatibility constraint. Whether this condition is met depends on the 
distribution and aggregate level of wealth across households and the distribution of 
abilities across children in the community.  A community poorly endowed with wealth 
but richly endowed with intelligence is likely to be unable to provide the optimal 
levels of education for many children. This simple model nonetheless captures the key 
elements of our story: that informal financing weakly dominates the household-only 
provision of education under any distribution of α and w , that spatial disparities in 
returns to human capital reduce the available supply of educational loans, and that this 
financial market imperfection will most adversely affect high ability children from 
poor households. 
2.3.3 The First-Best World 
While we have shown that informal credit is better than no credit, the incentive 
compatibility constraint results in inefficiencies and inequities in lending patterns.  For 
completeness, we investigate the extent of these inefficiencies by comparison with a 
complete, competitive credit market with perfect contract enforcement.19  
  In the first-best world of perfect credit markets, all children receive their 
ability-specific optimal level of education financing, regardless of whether they 
migrate or not.  Moreover, for those children whose parents discount the utility they 
receive from their children’s wellbeing (i.e. - where )1<β , the first-best optimal level 
                                                 
19 As the results of the first-best counterfactual are similar to most analyses of competitive markets, we 
limit ourselves here to a brief presentation of the key results.  A complete analysis with detailed 
derivations is available in the working paper version, available from the authors upon request. 
  37
of education strictly dominates the purely household-funded optimal level of 
education for all but the lowest ability children who would remain in the rural village 
regardless.  Perfectly enforceable credit contracts make the migration decision 
independent of the education financing problem.  This lowers the threshold level of 
innate ability needed to migrate and in equilibrium increases educational lending and 
attainment, especially by high ability children. Absent first-best credit markets, 
informal credit increases the funding available for children’s education and thus 
increases educational attainment.  But informal credit fails to fulfill the demand by 
higher ability children from poorer households, creating important inefficiencies and 
inequities. 
2.4  Discussion and Policy Implications 
 The central results of our model highlight three key points.  First, spatially 
varied returns to education tighten the incentive compatibility constraints inherent in 
imperfectly enforceable credit markets and thereby limit the usefulness of informal 
educational loans.   
 Second, our model underscores the importance of effective credit contract 
enforcement mechanisms for optimal investment in children’s education, especially 
for children of relatively high innate ability. Perfectly enforceable education loans 
afford children the opportunity to realize their full potential and to break free of 
poverty traps caused by low initial household wealth endowments.  But when 
migration options constrain informal community financing, poor children’s prospects 
may be severely limited by their parents’ poverty, as in Loury (1981).  
Third, increasing spatial inequality in productive infrastructure without any 
significant improvements in loan contract enforcement mechanisms increases 
incentives for rural-to-urban migration.  But children from relatively wealthy homes 
are disproportionately able to capitalize on these opportunities as informal education 
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loans become increasingly supply-constrained when urban-rural productivity 
differences grow.  Thus, as the urban-rural poverty gap increases, poor children of 
high innate ability become increasingly consigned to a low-education poverty trap of 
the sort first posited by Loury (1981). 
 If increasing educational attainment in less-favored rural communities, 
especially among high ability children, is an objective for policymakers, then our 
analysis suggests a means by which public investment might “crowd in” private 
educational investment.  Governments and donors might improve rural infrastructure 
in ways that encourage private business investment that stimulates skilled employment 
and thereby raises the expected returns to human capital.  This might include programs 
of rural electrification, improvements in rural communication infrastructure, road 
improvement and maintenance, and provision of police protection.  Improving rural 
infrastructure reduces incentives to migrate out of rural villages, making informal loan 
contract enforcement easier and thereby increasing the provision of private, informal 
finance.   
 Though such a policy would indeed relax the incentive constraints on the 
informal financial market and weakly improve access to education loans, its aggregate 
impact depends on the availability of local funds for educational investment.  It would 
also depend on whether the returns to investment in the education of non-kin children 
provided higher returns than other investments. Recall that our model abstracted away 
from aggregate wealth constraints.  Where this assumption does not hold, the informal 
credit market will be further limited by a binding loan availability constraint.  
Moreover, as relative returns to productive infrastructure increase in the rural area, 
alternative, non-educational investment opportunities may become increasingly 
attractive.  Together, these factors may decrease the share of community funds 
available for long-term investments in education. 
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 If development processes such as growing urban-rural labor productivity gaps 
unleash forces that undermine the effectiveness of informal credit markets, it becomes 
crucial to develop universally accessible formal financial markets.  Toward this end, 
governments and donors should invest in credit contract enforcement, perhaps through 
credit reporting bureaus or improved judicial processes, in order to stimulate the 
supply of education loans. 
 It would be instructive to expand this model to allow for dynamics to explore 
the potential divergence of rural and urban livelihoods and the prospective 
intergenerational reproduction of poverty.  Indeed, as poorer and less skilled 
individuals tend to remain in the rural area, we would expect that spatial mobility 
combined with imperfect credit markets would yield over time a rural population with 
a distribution of innate abilities and wealth that results in a decreased rate of migration 
and a low steady-state level of rural educational attainment and productivity. The 
simple two-period model we have developed nonetheless provides a credible answer 
to the puzzle of underinvestment of education in rural areas based on the twin 
empirical regularities of spatially varied returns to human capital and imperfect loan 
contract enforcement in rural credit markets. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3 MAKING LOANS TO MAKE FRIENDS: Explaining the Dismal 
Financial Performance of Financial Service Associations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 It is now widely acknowledged that lack of access to credit is a major 
impediment to the alleviation of poverty.  The poor, who may benefit from securing 
credit to invest in profitable self-employment or small enterprise projects, oftentimes 
do not have the collateral needed to secure a loan from formal credit markets (Mosley 
1986, Udry 1990).  Without the requisite collateral, conventional individual-liability 
lending arrangements become unprofitable for formal banking institutions who face 
prohibitively high monitoring and information gathering costs that encourage the twin 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.  This leads to binding credit 
constraints. 
 There has been a surge of interest over the past decade in a variety of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) that have arisen as second best solutions that can 
offer credit to customers with no collateral and still induce rates of repayment that are 
relatively high and allow for self-sufficiency.  These MFIs largely share the common 
feature of requiring borrowers to form groups in which all borrowers are held jointly 
liable for each other’s loans.   As a joint-liability contract is likely to invite groups of 
acquaintances and close associates, such collective credit agreements alleviate the 
problems of informational asymmetry and costly monitoring and can thereby support 
credit agreements that conventional banking practices cannot.   
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 Economic theorists have focused a lot of attention on understanding the 
mechanisms by which these MFIs thrive in environments where formal financial 
markets are thin or non-existent.  The literature has identified several theories 
explaining microfinance success (See Ghatak and Guinnane 1999, and Morduch 1999, 
for recent surveys).  Most of these explanations rely fundamentally on the existence of 
strong personal ties to community norms that sustain nonopportunistic behavior and 
transmit personal information across the community network.  Besley and Coate 
(1995) argue that the credible threat of social sanctions in such environments acts as a 
deterrent to reneging on group loan agreements.  Here, the high personal value placed 
on social capital acts as a viable substitute for asset collateral.  In a similar vein, 
Stiglitz (1990) shows how jointly-liable contracts can induce peer monitoring efforts 
that both lower interest rates and increase repayment rates.  As their interests are also 
at stake, group members have an incentive to punish partners that renege on their 
responsibilities and in so doing limit the incidence of moral hazard.  Group-lending 
contracts can also solve problems of adverse selection by offering contracts that 
encourage peer selection strategies that identify risky groups from safe groups 
(Ghatak, 1999).   
 Along with the theoretical advances that highlight the various ways in which 
joint-liability lending institutions outperform formal banking institutions, the 
programmatic success of the pioneer group-lender, Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank, has 
catapulted microfinance delivery to the forefront of development practices. Over the 
three decades since its inception in 1976, the Grameen Bank built up an impressive 
program offering collateral-free loans to groups of jointly liable poor villagers in rural 
Bangladesh, with a primary focus on women.  By 1994, the Bank was the largest 
micro-lender in Bangladesh with a cumulative investment over US$1 billion disbursed 
over more than 2 million members, 94% of whom were women (Grameen Bank, 
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1994).   Riding this wave of success, the microfinance concept spread rapidly 
worldwide and was touted as a new paradigm of economic development.  
Microfinance programs enjoyed wide support among development practitioners and 
donors have been more than willing to provide funds to extend the reach of such 
programs among marginal and vulnerable populations worldwide.   
 In 1997, a meeting of high profile donors, development practitioners and 
organizations produced a document hailing MFIs as the key element in fostering 
economic and social development in the 21st century and began an initiative, the 
Microcredit Summit Campaign, to raise $20 billion to support microfinance startup 
schemes for the following 10 years (Microcredit Summit Report, 1997).  By 2005, the 
sum of MFIs affiliated with the Microcredit Summit Campaign reported a clientele 
numbering close to 100 million persons, more than 70% of whom were classified 
among the poorest of the poor when their first loan was issued.  The Campaign has 
been extended to 2015, and has set the goal of ensuring that 175 million of the world’s 
poorest families (about 875 million individuals) have access to credit for 
entrepreneurial and other productive projects (Daley-Harris, 2005). 
 While we applaud this achievement and recognize the crucial role that access 
to credit can and does play in providing the poor with a pathway out of poverty, a 
history of unmet expectations and checkered success begs for caution.  The success of 
MFIs are often defined by the following criteria: the number of borrowers served, the 
repayment rates, and the volume lent.  Outside of Bangladesh and Indonesia, however, 
MFIs have had limited success.  Several studies have highlighted instances in which 
MFIs failed to meet their key objectives, or even had a negative impact on members 
(Osterloh 2003, Zeller and Meyer 2002, Kaboski and Townsend 2000, Morduch 1999, 
Rahman 1999, Deschamps 1989, Braverman and Guasch 1984).  In Kenya, for 
example, after fifteen years of microfinance programmes and over $100 million of 
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donor money spent, only about 70,000 individuals had been reached (Jazeyeri, 2000).  
Furthermore, there are often no monitoring mechanisms to verify NGO claims about 
outreach and impact.  The problem is further aggravated by eager donors who do not 
impose stringent conditions on the funds they give out and do not worry much about 
future sustainability or consequences (Gaspart and Platteau 2005, Morduch 1999). In 
many areas, opening an NGO, MFI or otherwise, has become a business whereby 
savvy entrepreneurs take advantage of the overzealous donor interest in such programs 
to enrich themselves (Mosse 2001, Harrison 2002, Jazeyeri 2000).  The relative ease 
of attracting donor funds has generated an artificial demand for MFIs which are too 
often hapharzardly implemented and marketed.  The result has been an alarming 
increase in micro-indebtedness by unsuspecting members with the consequence of a 
rise of social tensions that threatens to erode the selfsame social capital on which these 
programs base their success (Rahman, 1999). 
 This paper investigates the ways in which microfinance provision, an idea with 
great potential, can unravel and yield perverse outcomes that are counterproductive to 
its stated objectives.  Specifically, we focus on Financial Service Associations (FSA), 
a particular and novel form of MFI whose structure was actually designed to mitigate 
some of the problems that befall the customary MFI.  Despite the logic and grand 
claims of FSA promise, Osterloh (2003) documents a dismal reality of poorly 
performing FSAs in Kenya.  Building on Osterloh, we construct a model explaining 
the failure of these FSAs.  We argue that the set of assumed community and individual 
characteristics upon which the success of FSAs crucially depend, do not adequately 
represent the environment and behavioral motivations of the clientele. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  The following section contains 
a brief description of the concept and structure of FSAs and describes more 
specifically the role that FSAs have played in Kenya.  In section 3, we develop a 
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simple model to explain why FSAs have had little success in Kenya. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
3.2 Financial Service Associations 
3.2.1 Concept and Operation  
  FSAs differ from traditional MFIs in that they do not rely on outside sources of 
funding to finance credit provision.  Rather, in the FSA model, equity capital for loans 
are generated by selling shares to community members.  The total value of the shares 
sold generates the loan fund, redistributable amongst members via credit.  The 
purchase of a share confers membership.20  Shares are priced low enough to allow for 
community wide participation but benefits are increasing in shares held to reward 
investment in the bank.  For example, in the Kenyan FSAs Osterloh (2003) studies, 
credit limits are set at four times the value of a member’s shares. 
 Being locally owned, financed and managed, FSAs were designed to assure 
sustainability and exploit the informational advantages common to traditional 
communities.  Moreover, FSAs were to encourage the development of local 
management and entrepreneurial capacity by inducing incentives for efficient 
monitoring of FSA accounts and for capitalizing on the opportunity of accessible 
investment loans (Jazeyeri, 2000).  Since the FSA model emerged through a pilot 
project in South Africa in 1994, FSAs have proliferated across the African continent.  
By the year 2000, over 160 FSAs were functioning in 8 different countries (Benin, 
Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, South Africa and Uganda).  In total, they 
                                                 
20 FSAs resemble early models of credit unions in that they were also informal organizations in which 
members pooled money amongst themselves to create a loaning fund accessible only to members 
(Clark, 1943). Over time, lessons learned through failure or sub-par performance culminated in formal 
organizational structures governing credit union (Black and Dugger, 1981). 
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had made over $2.5 million in loan disbursements and had a combined membership of 
over 50,000 (Jazeyeri, 2000).     
3.2.2 The Kenyan Experience 
 Evidence from the FSA experience in Kenya, however, paints a somber 
picture.  In a detailed analysis of ten FSAs serving various regions across Kenya, 
Osterloh (2003) shows that repayment rates are well below those required for financial 
sustainability.  Loan repayment data from 894 of the 976 total loans issued by the 
sample FSAs show that 315 (35%) of the loans were found to be in arrears.  Defined 
as loans with principal past due, the amount in arrears represented 24% of the total 
value of loans issued and 64% of total share capital.  Furthermore, while FSA bylaws 
require that late principal is penalized by a 15% premium on the interest rate, Osterloh 
found that none of the sample FSAs reliably and consistently imposed the penalties.  
Moreover,  a majority of unpaid loans are those taken out by wealthy members.  
Indeed, the 20 largest loans in default  represented 14% of the total share value of all 
ten FSAs (Osterloh, 2003).  As loan amounts are capped at a multiple of the shares 
one owns in the FSA, each of the 20 loans were too large to have been provided to any 
but the wealthiest members of the FSAs.  In essence, this means that poorer members 
are subsidizing non-performing loans to the rich and the FSA in effect acts as an 
implicit regressive tax vehicle redistributing the meager wealth of the poor to the 
relatively wealthy! 
 This perverse consequence of an otherwise promising initiative may be due to 
an inadequate and incomplete characterization of individual motivations in traditional 
communities.  The low asymmetries of information that traditional communities enjoy 
is frequently cited as endowing such communities with the social infrastructure upon 
which they can pursue economic transactions despite the absence of formal enabling 
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institutions. Unfortunately, less attention is given to those features of social 
embeddedness, such as the politics of patronage and power, that are equally common 
to traditional communities and serve to undermine the productive potential of social 
cohesion (Barrett 2003, 2005a, Gaspart and Platteau 2005, Platteau and Abraham, 
2002).   
 The experience of FSAs in Kenya serves as a good case study that reveals 
some of the ‘imperfections’ of tight-knit communities that limit their ability to sustain 
and induce economically beneficial and social welfare enhancing behavior.  In 
environments often targeted by MFIs, the high degree of socialization also gives rise 
to a culture of patronage and favor-peddling.  Empowered by a leadership role in a 
local FSA, for example, an individual may be compelled to use loan provision and 
monitoring decisions to buy influence and secure or maintain goodwill among friends 
and neighbors.  In fact, once perceived to be in a position of privilege, turning one’s 
back on requests for assistance could invite retribution from one’s network of 
associates (Platteau 2000, Platteau and Abraham 2002).  The result is a tendency to 
offer credit to individuals who are not likely to meet repayment conditions and a 
weakened resolve to impose ex-post sanctions to punish defaulters.  As Osterloh 
(2003) points out, in Kenya, the Credit Committee formed specifically to use local 
information on loan applicants to screen out ex-ante credit risks in one FSA (North 
Horr) turned down only 8 of 340 loan applications.  This may also explain why none 
of the FSAs studied by Osterloh charged penalties on late repayments of principal. 
 The structure and design of FSAs make them particularly vulnerable to the 
influences of patronage and favor-peddling.  The FSA is typically managed by a 
Board of Directors (BoD) democratically elected by the shareholders.  The BoD is 
then in charge of managing all FSA resources, making loan decisions, keeping the 
accounts, and so on.  Because they preside over the equity capital generated by all 
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member’s savings, any losses the FSA incurs do not directly affect the BoD but rather 
are spread out in a general devaluation of all members’ share values.  Thus, if the 
disutility from rejecting a loan application ex ante and enforcing penalties ex post 
(which the BoD bears personally) is greater than the consequent loss in share value 
(which is borne by the entire membership), the BoD may rationally (self-interestedly) 
choose to knowingly offer loans that underperform.  It is important to note that FSA 
funds are drawn exclusively from the community and thus any losses incurred by 
offering loans to unproductive members and failing to punish defaulters is absorbed by 
the entire membership in the form of eroding share values.  This has serious 
implications for poverty alleviation efforts especially if, as Osterloh shows, a vast 
majority of principal in arrears is held by relatively wealthier members who default on 
loans. 
 In what follows, we develop a simple model of FSA style micro lending to 
explain the dismal performance of the FSAs in Kenya and to highlight the 
organizational features that limit its effectiveness.  Where credit providers can invite 
social retribution for denying loans to friends and neighbors, the resulting nonmaterial 
incentive to offer loans to individuals who are uncreditworthy in expectation results in 
the provision of nonperforming loans.  This effect becomes more pronounced under 
the organizational structure of the FSA, whereby credit committees bear the full social 
cost of screening applicants, but only share in a fraction of the financial benefits of 
good financial stewardship.  Arguing that the costs of rejecting wealthy applicants are 
higher, we show that credit committees relax their screening and enforcement 
functions in proportion to the applicant’s wealth.  By extension, we highlight the 
resulting redistributive effects, wherein the deteriorating share value of poorer 
members subsidize nonperforming loans to the wealthy. 
 
  51
3.3 The Model 
 The framework is a two-period, principal-agent model with a single risk-
neutral principal and multiple risk neutral agents.21  The principal, who makes lending 
decisions, denotes the FSA management.  While in practice the management is 
comprised of a board of several persons, abstracting to a single individual does not 
alter the main results. The agents are FSA members.  Each member is endowed with a 
productivity parameter α  with support (0,1]. Definingα  as the probability of a 
successful outcome in pursuing an investment project, we assume that all members 
have the option of investing in a project θ  that yields 0>θ  with probability α  and 
0=θ  with probability )1( α− .  The lender, by virtue of the rich information structure 
present in traditional communities, is able to costlessly establish each borrower's 
productivity parameter α .   
 The projects require a fixed cost of K which members can only finance by 
obtaining a loan from the FSA.  Because members are not required to offer collateral 
to obtain credit, the loans are of limited liability in nature.  That is, if they realize a 
project outcome of θ , they cannot repay their loans and must default.  Following the 
convention in the literature, we allow for such ‘liquidity-constraint’ defaults and seek 
only to investigate the incidence and determinants of ‘strategic’ defaults whereby 
borrowers have a high project realization, θ , and are therefore able to repay their 
loans, but chose instead to default. 
                                                 
21 We borrow the general structure of our model from de Aghion (1999).  However, where de Aghion 
analyzes a joint-liability contract agreement between a conventional bank and two jointly-liable 
associates, we extend the model to highlight the specific structure of the FSA wherein an elected board 
makes the screening and monitoring decisions on behalf of the entire membership. 
  52
3.3.1 Base Case:  No Moral Hazard 
 To fix ideas, we first model the unrealistic scenario in which borrowers 
voluntarily repay their loans without coercion.  We will later build up the model, 
subsequently introducing the specific organizational features of FSAs, as well as more 
realistic assumptions on the behavioral motivations of both borrowers and lenders.  
Assume that all members (henceforth borrowers) are completely honest and will not 
default for strategic reasons.  Assume also that the principal,(henceforth the lender) is 
the sole provider of micro credit loans and he seeks to maximize his expected net 
profit.  This implies that the lender will only offer loans if, 
01 ≥α−−α K)(Kr            (1) 
where r is the gross interest rate which we take to be given.22  Solving equation (1) for 
α  we get, 
r+≥α 11                                 (2) 
Let )r(*α  equate equation (2).  Then, for all borrowers with *α≥α , the lender will 
offer the loan.  For all *α≥α , we assume that θ  is such that Kr>θα .  This assures 
that the expected net present value of undertaking the project is positive for all 
members who are offered loans (otherwise a risk-neutral member would not request a 
loan) and that they can in fact repay their loans conditional on realizing θ (else the 
lender would not offer the loan).  
3.3.2 Self-Interested FSA Members 
 Now, suppose instead that borrowers are self-interested and, even upon 
realizing θ , will only repay their loan if the personal benefits of repaying outweigh 
those of reneging.  In addition, to introduce a key feature of the FSA structure, recall 
                                                 
22 We hold the interest rate r to be exogenous in order to highlight the central decision making features 
over which local FSA management have control: the screening of applicants and the sanctioning of 
defaulters.  Interest rates are often set independently by implementing NGOs. 
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that FSA rules only allow members who have shareholdings in the association to take 
out loans, with the maximum loan being a multiple of a member’s share value.  As 
such, if a borrower reneges, we assume that they forfeit the shares that they hold in the 
FSA. Denote ϕ1  as the multiple of share holdings that sets the upper bound of the 
loan amount a member can obtain; ϕK  is thus the share value needed to support the 
loan amount K.23 
 In addition we assume that failure to repay ones loan’s conditional on realizing 
θ  is punishable by the imposition of social sanctions, S.  The lender, who will impose 
the sanctions on any strategic defaulter, must first be able to ascertain a borrower’s 
project realization.  We model this by introducing a monitoring technology whereby 
the lender undertakes to monitor the borrower’s activities with the aim of uncovering 
the borrower’s project realization. We assume a perfect monitoring technology. A 
lender who decides to monitor borrowers will always accurately determine project 
realizations.  Denote γ  as the probability that the lender will monitor the borrower.  
Should a borrower decide to default strategically, the lender will discover the deceit 
and punish the borrower to the tune of S.24  The borrower has information on γ .25  
Monitoring, however, takes effort and is not costless to the lender.  We assume a 
linear cost of monitoring and denote c as the marginal cost of γ .26   
                                                 
23 For simplicity, we assume that all members have the same value of shares in the FSA and that K is 
the maximum amount they can borrow.  That is, all members have ϕK  worth of shares in the FSA. 
While in reality wealthier members are likely to own more shares and take bigger loans, this 
simplification only strengthens our result that screening and monitoring functions are increasingly 
ineffective in member’s wealth.  If wealthier members were to take larger loans and default, poorer 
members would only experience a faster deterioration in the share value. 
24 In communities with a high degree of socialization, where members place a high value on their social 
standing and relationships, social sanctions can involve the exclusion of deviant members from valuable 
community networks or the costly tarnishing of their reputations. 
25 This assumption turns on the existence of low asymmetries of information present in tightly-knit 
traditional communities.  
26 Cost of monitoring can also be interpreted as a reluctance to impose sanctions on a member of one’s 
own community since, for example, it may result in tensions that could damage valuable relationships. 
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 The timing of the model is as follows. First, lenders observe α  and decide 
whether to extend the loan.  If they decide to extend the loan, they then make their 
monitoring decision, which the borrower observes.  In the next period, project returns 
are realized and borrowers receiving positive realizations decide whether to repay the 
loan or whether to default.  Strategic defaulters who were monitored are then 
sanctioned. We model this problem as a two stage game and solve for the sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium through backward induction.   
 In the second stage, a borrower, having realized θ , will then only repay if: 
SKKr γθϕθ −≥+−                               (3) 
In order to assure repayment, a lender must thus set γ  such that. 
S
rK )( ϕγ −≥                         (4) 
Let )S,M,r,K(*γ solve equation (4) with equality27.  Knowing this, in the first stage, 
the lender chooses γ  such that  
0)1( ≥−−− KcKr αγα                                           (5) 
Since the marginal cost of sanction is increasing to the lender, he will set γ  equal to 
*γ or zero.  Given the present structure, 0=γ implies that the lender has offered a loan 
but chooses not to impose sanctions against defaulters.  With no threat of sanctions, 
the only loss to a borrower who reneges are his shares in the FSA, valued at ϕK , that 
he would necessarily forfeit.  Since ϕKKr > , if 0=γ , a borrower will strategically 
default and the lender will incur a loss of K  per loan.28  Clearly, a lender will set 
                                                 
27 Since ]1,0(∈γ , we assume )( ϕ−≥ rKS .  Indeed, all informal credit enforcement methods that 
rely on the credible threat of sanctions require them to be powerful enough to act as a deterrent to 
contract default.  Consequently, the vast majority of the literature analyzing informal contract 
enforcement is set in rural traditional communities where the relatively high degree of social 
embeddedness justifies the use of sanctions as a powerful enforcement device.   
28 Recall that as the gross interest rate, 1>r , and as the borrowing fraction 1<ϕ . 
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*γ=γ  on all loans offered, and not offer any loans to borrowers who are expected to 
renege.29  Solving equation (5) forα , we get 
)1(1
1 *
+++≥ rK
c
r
γα                                        (6) 
 Let γα  solve equation (6) with equality, γα  then represents the threshold 
probability of success below which a lender will not lend to a prospective borrower.  It 
is easy to see that *α>αγ .  Therefore, the space of borrowers whose productivity 
parameter falls between ),[ * γαα , who were eligible for loans when default was not an 
option, are no longer considered creditworthy.  This represents a decline in aggregate 
social welfare as all borrowers with *α≥α  have a positive net present value of project 
investment (See Figure 1 in section 3.3).  Where borrowers are opportunistic, γα  is 
nonetheless the second best optimal productivity threshold. 
3.3.3 Community Norms and Personal Incentives Supporting Assistance 
 We now extend the model by incorporating a particularly important decision 
making determinant that has so far been left out of models of informal microfinance 
lending.  The same tight-knit traditional ties that allow lenders to rely on the credible 
threat of social sanctions should a borrower default may also limit their ability to make 
decisions solely on the basis of the expected profitability of loans.  A well-known 
feature of traditional societies is their strong egalitarian tendency (Platteau, 2000).  
Redistributive norms may consequently develop and persist to maintain equality and 
limit the emergence of class, or to keep members from accumulating wealth that 
would enable them to evade their obligation to community insurance or consumption 
smoothing pools (Fafchamps 1992, Platteau 2000). A lender who has the capacity to 
assist a borrower in the form of offering credit might invite scorn from the community 
                                                 
29 In what follows, we assume that .* Kc <γ   If not, monitoring loans would cost more than the loan 
value itself and the FSA, or any other credit scheme, would not rationally exist. 
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if he refuses to extend a loan.  Furthermore, a lender might have a personal incentive 
to oblige certain, often more powerful, members of the community or friends, family 
and neighbors.  Special favors to powerful individuals may return positive dividends 
in the future or may serve to solidify patron-client relationships that are common in 
more traditional communities. 
 We model this mechanism by further endowing each borrower with wealth w 
that is known to the lender, where a borrower’s wealth can be interpreted as a 
metaphor for the ‘power’ they wield in the society and therefore their expected value 
as a friend.  We then impose a cost wδ  on the lender for refusing to extend loans.  The 
parameter δ captures the generalized norm of assistance that compels the lender to 
assist any member of the community.  Consequently, a lender will now offer loans if 
the following condition holds: 
wKcKr δαγα −≥−−− )1(*                         (7) 
Solving this for α  we get, 
)1(1
1 *
+
−++≥ rK
wc
r
δγα                                         (8) 
Let wδα  solve equation 8 with equality.  Note that 0
)(
)( <∂
∂
δ
α δw  and 0
)(
)( <∂
∂
w
wδα .  This 
 implies γδ αα ≤w , signifying that the lender now offers credit to borrowers whose 
expected financial return on the loan is negative.  Moreover, it now becomes possible 
for a lender to offer a loan to some clients but fail to monitor them with positive 
probability.   This will occur if the disutility of refusing to grant a member a loan, wδ , 
is greater than the value of a lost loan, K .  In other words, if the expected return on a 
loan that requires positive monitoring effort (and thus a sufficient and credible threat 
of sanctions conditional on default) is less than the cost of the loan, but a lender is still 
compelled by the logic of social norms and his own personal incentives to offer the 
loan, he is better off not incurring the cost of monitoring and instead writing off the 
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loan.  As we know, all non-monitored borrowers will subsequently default sanction-
free.   
 More formally, we know that a loan will be granted to all applicants with 
wealth w satisfying Kw ≥δ .  Let δ
Kw =  denote the minimum wealth threshold for 
 which securing a loan is guaranteed.  Recall the decision making process a lender 
faces.  First, he decides whether to offer the loan.  Conditional on offering a loan, he 
then decides whether to monitor the loan, i.e., whether to set 0=γ or *γγ = .  Thus 
far, all members offered loans were monitored with probability *γ .  With the 
introduction of wδ , however, a subset of members with ww ≥ will not be monitored; 
they will essentially be given free loans, or grants.   
 To determine who receives free loans, note that once a loan is offered, the 
lender will lose K if he fails to monitor the loan and can expect KcKr )1(* αγα −−−  
if he monitors.  Thus, for all α  satisfying, 
KKcKr −<−−− )1(* αγα                              (9) 
the expected return on a monitored loan is less than the value of a lost loan and giving 
a free loan is the dominant strategy for the lender.  Let k−α  solve equation (9) with  
equality.  It is easy to see that 
)1(
*
+=
−
rK
ck γα .  Consequently all members with a 
wealth productivity parameter such that ww ≥  and k−< αα  will be given free 
loans30. 
 Graphical representations may provide greater clarity of the problem.  In 
Figure 3.1, we first graph the second-best productivity threshold, γα , against the first-
                                                 
30 Note that this implies that at wealth level greater than w , applicants are implicitly punished for 
having productivity greater than K−α .  This is essentially a construct of the model that arises from that 
fact that lenders invite retribution for screening out applicants but  not for monitoring them.  As such, 
since members with K−> αα have expected profits (or losses) greater than the cost of a free loan, they 
are monitored.  From the  point of view of the FSA, however, any loan given to a member with 
γαα < is loss making, with losses moving inversely with α until the lower threshold for losses on a 
single loan, K, is reached at K−α . 
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best, *α .  Note that productivity thresholds are independent of borrower wealth in both 
instances.  The shaded area represents the space of members whose loan applications 
will be accepted and will subsequently be monitored with probability *γ .  In 
expectation, all these loans yield weakly positive profits to the lender.  Insofar as it 
represents lost opportunities for accessing credit, the space between *α  and 
γα represents the aggregate loss of welfare due to costly monitoring in the face of self-
interested borrowers.  This space increases ( γα increases) as the disutility of 
monitoring, c, increases, or the personal cost of social sanctions, S, decreases. 
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Figure 3.1:  Loans Offered Under Costly Monitoring 
 
 In Figure 3.2, we depict the effect of incorporating non-material considerations 
on the part of the lender that arise from community norms and personal incentives that 
support the provision of loss-making loans.  We draw in the productivity threshold 
wδα  that results when the lender factors in these considerations into his loaning 
decisions. wδα is downward sloping in w indicating greater leniency in loan provision 
to the wealthy.  We also draw in w , the wealth above which loan provision is 
guaranteed.  That wδα crosses w  at K−α can be easily verified by  substituting w for w 
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in wδα and performing a simple algebraic manipulation.  Up to ww = , all loan 
applicants falling to the right of wδα will be granted loans and monitored.  Above w , 
applicants falling to the right of K−α are monitored.  The subset of these that lie in the 
lightly shaded area will yield financial losses to the lender in expectation.  Those 
falling in the dark shaded area are given free, unmonitored loans.   
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Figure 3.2:  Effect of Assistance Norms and Patronage Incentives on Loans Offered 
 
 To briefly summarize, we have thus far shown that where social externalities 
give lenders a personal incentive to grant powerful members special privileges 
( 0>wδ ), they are likely to provide loans to uncreditworthy but relatively wealthy 
borrowers; individuals who in expectation represent negative profits to the lender.  
These individuals will nonetheless be monitored with probability *γ  and punished by 
sanctions should they attempt to default conditional on a positive realization.  
However, where these non-material incentives are particularly strong (when 
wKr δ< ), lenders may extend free credit.  That is, they will provide loans to 
borrowers with no intention of monitoring and full expectation of default. These 
borrowers, who we assume know the value of γ , will thus all renege on their debt 
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repayment commitment.  While such a policy affects all members by way of the 
generalized norm, δ , the wealthier members of society (those to whom personal 
favors are likely to generate positive externalities) fare better.  The wealthier one is, 
the more likely they are to be extended a free loan.  While this is a crucial result, its 
consequence is most potent in the FSA setting, to which we now turn.   
3.3.4 Modeling the FSA 
 We now extend the model to better capture the structure of the FSA.  
Previously, we modeled a leader who was compelled by certain social norms to 
provide non-performing loans.  One may rightfully dismiss such a situation as 
unrealistic. Indeed, why should any person present themselves as a lender in an 
environment in which they are set up to suffer losses?  In an FSA, however, the 
“lender” is not an individual using his own resources as equity.  Rather, the “lender” is 
simply an elected shareholder who makes decisions on behalf of all members.  
Essentially then, modeling the decision making process of an FSA requires one main 
alteration to the previous model.  The lender's (FSA manager) decision function must 
be modified to account for the fact that he now oversees total FSA profit but only 
receives indirect benefits in the form of increasing share values which are spread over 
all shareholders.  However, the FSA manager still bears the full brunt of the costs 
associated with rejecting loan applicants, wδ , and monitoring, *γc .  This mismatch of 
personalized losses from disciplined lending but generalized gains leads to socially 
suboptimal credit decisions. 
 Let N be the number of FSA members.  Assume all members hold a similar 
number of shares, thus profits are equally distributed among them.  The FSA manager 
will now offer loans and subsequently monitor loans and enforce sanctions to all 
members endowed with productivity parameter α  such that 
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w
N
Kc
N
Kr δαγα −≥−−− )1(*                                         (10) 
Solving equation (10) for α  we have 
)1(
)*(
1
1
rK
Nwc
r +
−++≥
δγα                              (11) 
Let wNδα solve equation (11) with equality.  The lender will thus offer loans in the 
general case to only those members with wNδαα ≥ .  Note that for N=1, wwN δδ αα = .  
 We ask first how increasing the size of the FSA impacts on the lenders’ 
decision making.  Differentiating wNδα by N we get have, 
)1()(
)( *
rK
wc
N
wN
+
−=∂
∂ δγα δ                                  (12) 
When wc δγ >* , it is evident that wNδα  is increasing in N.31  This means that as the 
size of the FSA increases, the lender will increase the probability of success required 
by borrowers and thus reduce the number of loans he will offer.  The intuition of this 
is fairly simple.  While financial benefits are now diffuse, the nonmaterial costs are 
personalized and fully absorbed the lender.  He must therefore increase the probability 
of success among his customers in order to minimize FSA losses.  Holding δ constant, 
note that increases in w mean that the quantity expressed in equation (12) gets smaller.  
As such, even though the space of members unable to attract loans grows due to 
increasing N, the space varies inversely with wealth. 
 When wealth increases such that wc δγ <* , wNδα  becomes decreasing in N and 
the lender okays more loan applications, despite knowing that this increases the 
number of borrowing members generating expected losses.  So long as the cost of 
rejecting a loan applicant, wδ , is greater than the expected financial loss from the 
                                                 
31 The expected cost of monitoring, *γc , will be larger than the nonmaterial incentive for offering 
loans, wδ , when threat of social sanctions, S, is a relatively weak deterrent of deviant behavior, when 
the generalized norm of assistance, δ is sufficiently low, and/or when the wealth of the borrower is 
significant.   
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loan, the imperative to assure that the FSA is profitable is dominated by the disutility 
of denying credit to wealthy members. 
 A lender will also be tempted to give out more free loans as the FSA grows in 
membership.  In this case, lenders will lose NK , their personal claim to the loan, if a 
borrower defaults.  As such, all loan applicants with wealth satisfying NKw >δ  will 
receive loans.  To find the subset of these that will get free loans, let NKw N δ= .  
Applying the same method as in section 3.3, substitute Nw for w in wNδα and simplify.  
The result is 
)1(
*
+=
−
rK
NcKN γα                                                  (13) 
the productivity level below which the expected return on a monitored loan is less than 
the value of a free loan.  Any member with wealth, Nww ≥  and productivity 
parameter KN−< αα will receive free loans.  It is clear that ww N ≤ and KKN −− ≥ αα , 
with the difference, in both cases, growing in N.   
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Figure 3.3:  Effect of Increasing FSA Membership on Loans Offered 
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 Figure 3.3 highlights the consequences of increasing FSA membership.  We 
highlight the space of members affected by increasing N.  The light shaded area 
represents those who are locked out of loan opportunities as membership grows.  Not 
only are the poorer members more adversely affected, but many who would be 
financially profitable to the FSA at large (those with γαα > ) are not offered loans.  
On the other hand, more members among the wealthy, whose loans constitute 
expected financial losses to the FSA, become eligible for loans.  The space of these 
members who receive monitored loans is given by the medium-shaded area, while the 
increase in members receiving free loans is given by the dark-shaded area. 
 To summarize, as the FSA gets larger in size, it gets increasingly inefficient as 
an informal credit device, becomes more unsustainable, and, most importantly, 
disadvantages the poor in favor of the rich.  This is particularly noteworthy given that 
the logic of FSAs requires a large membership.  In order to be able to provide loans, 
FSAs need to raise a significant amount of equity capital, and, if most of their 
membership are poor, this can only be done by signing on a large number of members.  
Because FSA members all own shares in the institution, if the wealthier members are 
screened in a less stringent manner, allowing them to default in greater numbers, 
poorer members disproportionately bear the brunt of decreases in share value, 
effectively subsidizing the wealthy with the eroding value of their share capital.  In 
effect, FSAs become an implicit regressive tax vehicle, redistributing wealth from the 
poor to the rich due to the social costs inherent to denying loans to ones friends and 
neighbors and the fact that such costs typically increase with the power and wealth of 
the prospective borrower.  This effect is magnified by the externality inherent to FSA 
lending decisions, wherein credit committee members personally incur the social costs 
of rejecting loan applicants but bear only a fraction of the costs of extending loans 
likely to prove unprofitable. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 Unlike canonical models that paint an overly optimistic picture of the potential 
of MFIs to thrive in traditional communities by exclusively highlighting their 
informational advantages, we introduce the common features of patronage and favor-
peddling into our model to explain the dismal financial performance of FSAs.  Where 
individuals known to be in positions of privilege will invite costly retribution from 
friends and neighbors if they neglect to share the benefits, or could provide favors that 
may yield future dividends, the advantages of low information asymmetries are likely 
to be dampened.  The irony is that the same high degree of socialization that confers 
informational advantages on traditional societies also breeds incentives for patronage 
and favor-peddling. 
 We show that where a culture of patronage exists, the consequent nonmaterial 
incentive additionally faced by credit providers causes them to relax their screening 
and enforcement intensity to the financial detriment of the organizations they serve. 
As the social costs of rejecting wealthy applicants are likely to be higher, the wealthy 
are particularly favored and may even be allowed to default without fear of sanction.  
We invoke this dynamic to explain the dismal financial performance of FSAs in 
Kenya as documented by Osterloh (2003). 
 By requiring credit committee members to bear the full burden of the social 
costs of screening applicants and sanctioning defaulters while financial benefits are 
spread out evenly across the membership, the structure of FSAs renders them 
particularly vulnerable to the provision of underperforming loans in the name of 
patronage.  In an analytical analog of Osterloh’s empirical evidence, we show that 
credit committees are induced to offer nonperforming loans to the wealthy that are 
indirectly paid by the eroding share value of the poor. As FSAs are targeted mainly 
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toward poor communities, the fact that the poor might be induced to place their 
meager savings into a scheme that ends up swallowing their wealth would be 
unfortunate. 
 This evidence calls for a critical reevaluation of FSA design, as well as 
mechanisms of microfinance provision more generally.  Furthermore, it cautions that a 
failed microfinance delivery mechanism is not simply a sub-optimal outcome but 
could quite easily result in perverse consequences that leave the intended beneficiaries 
worse off than they initially were.  Because the effectiveness of these institutions is 
highly contingent on the social context in which they operate, and because their failure 
has repercussions for poor and vulnerable members, the design of microfinance 
delivery mechanisms requires a detailed and nuanced understanding of the specific 
context in which they are to be implemented.  It must be remembered that while the 
bonds of friendship can facilitate the provision of informal loans, the converse is 
oftentimes true: offering cheap or free loans can secure friendship. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4 IMPERFECTIONS IN MEMBERSHIP BASED ORGANIZATIONS OF 
THE POOR: An Explanation for the Dismal Performance of Kenya’s 
Coffee Cooperatives 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Promoting the capacity of the poor to mobilize for collective action is 
increasingly championed as an effective mechanism to empower the poor and amplify 
their ability to leverage resources for their benefit.  The increasing attention paid to the 
catalytic role that membership based organizations of the poor can play in improving 
the welfare of the poor is a natural and complementary extension to the recent 
emphasis on decentralization of development services and on the positive role social 
capital can play to stimulate rural, traditional economies. 
 While a general consensus exists that empowering the poor to take a proactive 
role in their development should be a central pillar of development efforts, it is not as 
clear that membership based organizations are always the most effective means to 
achieve such ends or that they necessarily improve the welfare of their members.  
Numerous studies have documented cases in which collective organizations with a 
development mandate have failed to meet their stated objective, at times even leaving 
members worse off (Gugerty and Kremer 2004, Morduch 1999, Rahman 1999).  
Drawing from such experiences, a nascent literature now studies how the very act of 
creating a membership based organization can give rise to incentives that work against 
the original intended goals of the organization (Gugerty and Kremer 2004, Stiles 2002, 
Howes 1997). 
 This paper highlights this issue from the perspective of the smallholder coffee 
sub-sector in Kenya.  We hypothesize that the marked deterioration of coffee 
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cooperatives in Kenya can be partly explained by institutional changes in cooperative 
organization that gave full ownership and administrative control to members.  The 
rules by which cooperatives’ memberships elect their leaders, and the lack of 
accountability among the leadership, lends itself to capture by corrupt individuals 
whose rent-seeking predictably reduces members’ efficiency and welfare. 
 Before the advent of structural reforms in the nineties, coffee was Kenya’s top 
foreign exchange earner.  At that time the government played a key role in regulating 
the activities of the nation’s cooperatives.  Liberalization brought with it a withdrawal 
of government involvement in cooperatives and a series of reforms which culminated 
in the new Cooperatives Act of 1998. By this act, the government gave up its policy 
making jurisdiction over the economic activities of cooperatives.  Grower-members 
have fully owned and managed their cooperatives ever since.  Concurrently, payments 
made to coffee growers plummeted and the coffee smallholder industry found itself 
mired in increasing levels of corruption, political opportunism and gross 
mismanagement.  
 In a similar vein to Gugerty and Kremer (2004), we argue that the regulation 
change that made members fully responsible for running cooperatives changed the 
incentive structure facing members and officials in a way that counteracted the 
expected benefits to collective organization.   More specifically, we contend that 
unregulated access to cooperatives’ coffers now enjoyed by elected cooperative 
officials significantly increased the rents that self-interested officials could expect to 
extract from the treasury.  Consequently, and as widespread anecdotal evidence 
confirms, the process of electing a governing board from among the membership 
became subject to manipulation by rent-seeking candidates.   
 Based on this premise, we model the susceptibility of cooperatives to capture 
by corrupt and opportunistic members who would extract rents from collective 
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earnings for their own benefit.  We show that in the absence of formal rules to credibly 
punish bribery, members of a cooperative can rationally elect an official in open 
democratic elections who they know will reduce the returns they would otherwise 
receive from the cooperative.  The model, briefly summarized, works as follows. Due 
to the large rents a corrupt candidate can expect upon winning office, he is willing to 
buy the minimum required votes to guarantee an election victory.  As an honest 
candidate will not siphon cooperative profits for personal gain, she cannot afford to 
exchange favors for votes and is thus at a competitive disadvantage.  Voters, on the 
other hand, will accept any bribe that is at least equal to the expected loss in welfare 
they will sustain should their vote swing the election outcome. As the number of 
voters increase, the likelihood of being a swing voter decreases making it increasingly 
cheaper to buy votes and therefore more likely that a rent-seeking candidate will buy 
his way into office. 
 The very nature of corruption, however, makes it a tricky task to collect the 
requisite data accurately so as to undertake a robust empirical test that captures the 
presence of rent-seeking activity and its effect on the welfare of members.  As such, 
we take a somewhat indirect approach and test instead the validity of our model’s 
implications. Drawing on evidence from the smallholder coffee sub-sector in 
Murang’a District, Kenya, we show that contrary to widespread belief, smaller 
cooperatives are more efficient than their larger counterparts, a result that finds direct 
support in the model.  We also find that attributes of the cooperative indicative of rent-
seeking activity, such as performance measures and members’ perceptions, are 
directly related to farm level technical-efficiency.  The implication is that changes to 
cooperative voting procedures could reduce corruption and increase productivity and 
rural incomes. 
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 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows:  Section 4.2 gives a brief 
description of the institutional environment within which the coffee cooperatives 
function and provides the contextual justification for the assumptions used in the 
model.  Section 4.3 briefly summarizes the pertinent literature and discusses this 
paper’s contribution.  In Section 4.4 we build a model that captures the essence of the 
problem.  Section 4.5 introduces the data and offers empirical evidence to support our 
claims.  A discussion of our findings concludes the paper in Section 4.6.   
 
4.2 Coffee Cooperatives in Kenya 
4.2.1 Organizational Structure 
 Since its introduction as a cash crop in the early 1900s, coffee has traditionally 
been the backbone of Kenya’s rural highlands economy.  Coffee was the nation’s top 
foreign exchange earner from independence in 1963 until it was surpassed by tourism 
in 1989.  Since then, national coffee earnings have steadily declined and currently rank 
fourth after tourism, tea, and horticulture (Karanja, 2002). From its heyday in the 
1970s and 1980s, when international coffee prices were high and the government 
regulated production and marketing systems, Kenya’s coffee sector now finds itself in 
crisis.   
 Small-scale production systems dominate the Kenya agricultural sector, 
accounting for approximately 60 percent of marketed output.  The coffee sector is 
particularly affected by the fragmented nature of small-scale production with over 75 
percent of the land under production controlled by smallholder farmers.32 For this 
reason, the smallholder coffee sector has traditionally been organized into 
cooperatives in order to facilitate regulation and to improve the effectiveness and 
                                                 
32 Any farmer with less than five acres of land under coffee production is classified as a smallholder 
grower. 
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efficiency of coffee production, marketing and the provision of key inputs such as 
fertilizers, pesticides, credit and extension services.   
 The socio-economic landscape at the time, combined with the physiology of 
coffee, initially justified such an organizational structure.  As soon as coffee cherries 
are harvested they begin to ferment, a process that affects the quality of the bean.  This 
requires the cherries to be pulped as soon as possible after they are picked.  Pulping 
stations are thus needed to be sufficiently close to the farmer in order to assure prompt 
delivery.  As pulping stations involve large setup costs that are prohibitive to 
individual small growers, and as one pulping station can cater to hundreds of growers, 
it made sense to pool their resources together within a cooperative framework to share 
the setup costs and enjoy the resulting local economies of scale.  These pulping 
stations are called “factories”.  A single cooperative can encompass multiple factories.   
 All smallholders were and continue to be legally bound to market their coffee 
through cooperatives.  Each cooperative controls a loosely defined catchment area.33  
All coffee growers whose land falls within a particular catchment must register as a 
member with their respective cooperative.  Conditional on cooperative membership, 
the choice of which factory to deliver one’s coffee to is more flexible, being a function 
of proximity and political considerations34.  Essentially, the farmers’ only task is to 
grow the coffee, and deliver their product (coffee cherry) to their choosen pulping 
station.  In return, growers are paid twice annually.  The first payment comes at the 
beginning of the season (pre-harvest) as part of what is called Coffee Advance 
Payments (CAPS).  CAPS are often calculated as the lowest expected payment per 
                                                 
33 By loosely defined, we mean that no legally defined boundaries enclose the catchments.  A 
combination of natural borders (rivers, main roads, etc.), political boundaries (location, sub-location, 
etc.), and initial distribution of households across cooperatives at the time of their conception forms the 
basis of generally accepted informal boundaries that define catchments. 
34 While in theory, one is free to market through their factory of choice, switching pulping stations is 
generally frowned upon and is likely to invite sociopolitical retribution that limits one’s practical 
choices. 
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kilo for the coming season.  At the end of the season, after coffee sales have been 
realized and all requisite deductions taken, the remaining amount is then distributed to 
farmers as the second payment. 
 At the factory, the cherries from each grower are weighed, recorded and then 
put through the initial phase of processing.  Primary processing involves the sorting 
and pulping (removing the coffee bean from its outer fruit) of the cherry.  The beans 
are then laid out to dry and thereafter stored in the form of ”parchment coffee”, 
awaiting transportation to millers for secondary processing.  Millers hull and clean the 
parchment coffee to produce what is known as green (raw) coffee.  They then sort and 
grade the coffee by size and quality, bag it according to expected value, and send it 
forward to the coffee auctions through which, by law, all Kenyan coffee must be sold.  
The coffee in each bag belongs to one particular factory within the cooperative.  This 
allows for inter-factory price variation that takes into account variation in quality and 
thereby reduces the potential for moral hazard at the larger cooperative level.35. The 
transaction between buyer and seller at the auction is often carried out on behalf of the 
cooperative by an agent hired by the miller. 
 Once the coffee is sold, the miller deducts his share of the commission and 
sends the rest to the cooperative.  The larger cooperative management then deducts all 
of its operating costs including loan repayments, services and maintenance expenses, 
and other fees.  The deductions are made from factory kitties as a proportion of each 
factory’s membership to the total (i.e., uniform deduction per cooperative member).  
The remaining funds are then distributed to factory managers who further deduct the 
                                                 
35 Each factory pools their coffee cherry together such that each farmer’s contribution is 
indistinguishable.  Individual growers may therefore have the incentive to shirk on efforts to produce 
high quality coffee and free ride on the efforts of others within their factory group.  Factory specific 
pricing limits free-riding to the factory level.  
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costs of factory level operations then distribute the remaining money to farmers as 
their second annual payment.  
4.2.2 Institutional Evolution - the Reform Period 
 Reacting to pressure from international donors in the late eighties and early 
nineties, the government enacted a series of reforms aimed at the eventual 
liberalization of the Kenyan economy.  As Kenya’s main foreign exchange earner, the 
coffee sector was a major target for reforms.  In October 1992, the Coffee Board of 
Kenya (CBK) was authorized to conduct the Nairobi coffee auction in dollars and was 
later granted the permission to also pay farmers in dollars.  This lifted the implicit tax 
burden, estimated at 29%, that farmers previously faced due to an overvalued Kenyan 
Shilling (Ephanto, 1993).  Changes were also made to improve the system by which 
growers received revenues generated from sales of their coffee.  The new system 
eschewed the previous practice of pooling payments across time and farmers in order 
to reduce price variation across time and price spread between growers.  Under the 
new “direct-payments” scheme, growers could now receive payments for sales of their 
own coffee on a weekly basis, thus improving their liquidity and stimulating 
incentives for the production of quality coffee.36  
 Further reforms included the licensing of four new commercial millers in 1993 
thereby dismantling the monopoly in the milling sector previously held by the Kenya 
Planters Cooperative Union (KPCU). In 1996, efforts to stimulate production changed 
the rules governing the licensing of coffee growers.  The threshold acreage under 
coffee required for a grower to be registered as an individual planter (rather than a 
smallholder) was reduced from 20 to 5 acres.  The idea was to improve incentives for 
                                                 
36 The benefits to this policy did not accrue directly to smallholder farmers as the pooling of their 
payments continued at the cooperative level. 
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higher quality by increasing the number of growers benefiting from the “direct-
payments” scheme.   
 The policy change of particular interest to the hypothesis advanced in this 
paper involves the new Cooperatives Act of 1998 which gave farmers complete 
autonomy over the activities of the cooperative. Prior to 1998, the government played 
a major role in the running of cooperatives through the office of the commissioner of 
cooperatives, and their field-agents, led by district cooperative officers (DCOs).  
Although members owned the cooperatives and elected their board members, the 
commissioner’s office had powers to dissolve the governing board, call for fresh 
elections or directly appoint a care-taker committee.  DCOs were also involved in the 
vetting of candidates for management positions.  More importantly, DCOs were 
counted as extra-official members of the governing board and were mandatory 
signatories to all cheques and withdrawals made by the management.  The 
commissioner’s office was also the sole agent authorized to audit society accounts. 
 Under the new policy, government no longer had any policy making 
jurisdiction over the economic activities of cooperatives and took on a minimal 
advisory role.  Under the Cooperatives Act of 1998, cooperative board members were 
free to conduct elections as they pleased, make hiring decisions of their choice, and 
contract, if they so wished, their auditors of choice. DCOs were no longer required to 
co-sign on any financial transactions.  Extension services, previously provided through 
the Ministry of Agriculture, were also withdrawn.  In effect, cooperative board 
members now had complete authority over the running of cooperatives without the 
oversight of a regulatory agency with any teeth to prosecute malfeasance.  These 
changes increased the incentives to rent-seeking by providing board members with 
unfettered access to cooperative coffers without the fear of prosecution. 
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 Thereafter, payments to growers plummeted amid growing political 
opportunism at the grassroots level that damaged farmer morale and raised the level of 
corruption and mismanagement in cooperative administration.  Through the years, a 
general decline in the attendance of annual general meetings (AGMs), called to elect 
board members, ensued as growers began to be disillusioned by the electoral process.  
Widespread belief has it that a majority of those who continued to attend AGMs are 
bribed for a pittance.  Indeed several of the growers we talked to unabashedly 
acknowledged that they indeed had accepted bribes of Sh 100 (roughly, $1.40), or 
offerings of the local brew on election day to vote a particular candidate.  In this way, 
corrupt board members entrench themselves and embezzle the proceeds of coffee 
sales, further eroding the ailing cooperatives. 
4.2.3 Weak International Markets Are Not the Key Factor 
 In this paper, we argue that much of deterioration of the coffee cooperatives 
can be attributed to institutional changes that culminated in complete unregulated 
farmer autonomy over all aspects of cooperative management.  Anticipating critics 
who may instead argue that declining international coffee prices explain the bulk of 
Kenya’s smallholder coffee crisis, we provide some evidence that other key coffee 
exporting countries, similarly affected by low coffee prices, were not as adversely 
affected as Kenya.  This difference, we claim, is the result of the poor sequencing, 
design, and implementation of institutional reform in Kenya’s coffee sector. 
 The three figures below compare various indicators of the performance of 
Kenya’s coffee industry against five other coffee exporting nations that principally 
grow the high quality Arabica bean.  For ease of comparison, we standardize all 1994 
figures to parity at one hundred, and examine the relative trend of changes in the 
indicators vis-à-vis their 1994 position.  The price data was deflated to the 1994 level 
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to take control for inflation.  To better inform the comparisons, Table 4.1 below 
presents the 1994 levels data for the selected indicators (yield, production and price) 
across the six countries.   
 
Table 4.1:  1994 Levels for Coffee Indicators of Select Exporting Countries 
 
Kenya Costa Rica El Salvador Ethiopia Honduras Peru 
*Yield (Hg/Ha) 5,035 13,582 8,344 8,280 7,050 5,562 
*Production (Mt) 79,900 147,998 140,534 207,000 126,182 91,340 
**Price (US cents/lb) 251.4 137.2 194.6 184.3 163.1 97.9 
 Source: * Food and Agriculture Organization. ** International Coffee Organization 
 
 While Kenya posts the lowest total production and average yield of the six 
countries, it received the highest price for its coffee exports, a testament to the renown 
premium quality of its coffee. Peru on the other hand, second only to Kenya in its low 
yield and production, also posted the lowest price.  Of the six nations, Ethiopia had the 
highest total production in 1994, almost three times more than that of Kenya. Costa 
Rica, for its part, posted significantly higher yields than the rest. 
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                 Source: International Coffee Organization (ICO) Statistics 
Figure 4.1:  Green Coffee Prices for Select Exporting Nations 
  
 Figure 4.1 compares relative changes in the average price paid for green coffee 
across the chosen countries.  There has been a general downward trend in prices and 
all nations received a lower return for their coffee in 2002 than in 1994.  Kenya’s 
coffee in 2002 fetched approximately 35 percent of  the price that it did in 1994. Costa 
Rica and Honduras, whose 2002 coffee prices were approximately 47 and 37 percent 
of their 1994 level respectively, were the only countries whose coffee prices fell less 
that Kenya’s.  Both Ethiopia and El Salvador witnessed close to an 80 percent 
deterioration in the real price paid for the coffees between 1994 and 2002, while Peru 
faced a 70 percent drop. 
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      Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO_ Statistics) 
Figure 4.2:  Coffee Production for Select Exporting Nations 
 
 Despite the steep price decrease, Peru posted an impressive growth in total 
production of close to a 100 percent between 1994 and 2003 (Figure 4.2).  Kenya, on 
the other hand, which had relatively modest price decreases, witnessed a decrease in 
output to 65 percent of its 1994 level in 2002.  This significant contraction in output 
was mirrored only by El Salvador, which also posted the largest decrease in its prices. 
 Changes in average yields, another indicator of sector performance, further 
highlights the stagnation of Kenya’s coffee industry.  Despite posting the lowest 
relative yields in 1994 (See Table 4.1), it also posted the largest decrease in yields 
(Figure 4.3). In 2002, Kenya’s coffee yield was estimated to be only 60 percent of its 
1994 level.  Meanwhile, Peru and Ethiopia, both experiencing a relatively larger 
decline in price than Kenya, posted gradual and consistent increases in yield. 
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Figure 4.3:  Coffee Yields from Select Exporting Nations 
 
 These data indeed suggest that declining world prices for coffee cannot fully 
explain the collapse of the Kenyan coffee industry.  Other nations, similarly or worse 
affected by low prices, were not only able to maintain their aggregate output and 
average yields, but were in most cases able to increase yields and boost production.  
This indicates that additional circumstances specific to the Kenyan coffee industry 
must have amplified the negative consequences of the unfavorable international 
market.   
 Moreover, the preceding figures are national aggregates and therefore do not 
present an adequate picture of the plight of the smallholder sub-sector.  In the 1990s, 
the smallholder share of national coffee output was just below 60 percent on average.  
However, while production in the plantation sector decreased by around 39 percent in 
the last decade, the decline in smallholder farms was around 47 percent during the 
same period (Karanja et al., 2002).  Furthermore, smallholder yields are far less than 
estate yields.  Table 2 below presents a comparison of smallholder and estate 
production and yields through the 1990s. 
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Table 4.2:  Clean Coffee Production and Yields in Kenya: 1991/92 - 2000/01 
 Production (MT) Yield (kg/ha) 
Year Estates Smallholder National Estates Smallholder National 
1991/92 37,520 51,977   (58%) 89,497 987 439 565 
1992/93 32,781 42,426   (56%) 75,207 859 352 474 
1993/94 33,037 39,747   (54%) 73,516 860 324 457 
1994/95 32,795 62,567   (65%) 95,806 855 510 595 
1995/96 40,109 56,881   (58%) 97,576 1,045 464 606 
1996/97 29,737 38,261   (56%) 67,997 748 312 419 
1997/98 22,061 32,981   (60%) 55,042 555 269 339 
1998/99 28,700 39,400   (58%) 68,100 684 307 400 
1999/00 38,500 62,200   (62%) 100,700 916 485 592 
2000/01 26,900 24,800   (48%) 51,700 640 193 304 
Average 32,240 45,124    (58%) 77,514 815 365 475 
Source: Karanja et al. 2002 
 For the smallholder coffee farmer in Kenya, the combination of these three 
trends - declining prices, output and yields - contributed to a significant deterioration 
in the welfare of growers who for decades had depended on coffee incomes as a secure 
and relatively lucrative livelihood.   
4.2.4 Institutional Apparatus Undermining Cooperative Efficiency  
 In this sub-section, we discuss two features of the institutional environment in 
which cooperatives operate that undermine cooperative efficiency and facilitate rent-
seeking.  These features also provide the justifications for assumptions central to the 
model that we build in section 4.4. 
4.2.4.1 Perfect Vote Signaling 
 All of the nine coffee cooperatives we visited conducted their elections in the 
traditional fashion of mlolongo.  Mlolongo, literally translated as “line-up”, describes 
the method of having voters line up behind their preferred candidate with the 
candidate having the longest line winning the election.  Clearly, the consequence of 
such a method is that everybody knows who everybody else voted for.  This facilitates 
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vote-buying by offering a free and perfect enforcement mechanism for candidates.  A 
voter who might otherwise simply accept the bribe and thereafter vote independently 
under a secret-ballot regime must now consider the cost of near-certain punishment 
should he deviate.  A secret ballot system for democratic majority-rules elections 
weakly dominates a perfect signaling mlolongo approach.  Mlolongo provides the 
enforcement mechanism a rent-seeking candidate could use to advance his objective, 
undermining grower productivity in the process. 
4.2.4.2 Local Monopsony Power 
 Kenyan law requires all coffee growers with less than five acres of land under 
coffee to market their output solely through cooperatives.  Furthermore, due to poor 
transportation infrastructure and the need to pulp coffee cherry very soon after it is 
picked in order to avoid quality-reducing fermentation, each cooperative has a legally 
defined catchment area.  Making it illegal for cooperatives to buy coffee from growers 
outside their particular catchment area effectively grants cooperatives local 
monopsony protection and shields them from potential competition.  The logic of 
organizing to attain an input-output mix at the bottom of the long run average cost 
curve assumes a competitive market that requires collective cooperation among small 
producers who intend to be competitive.  Yet, protecting such organizations against 
competition discourages them from being efficient as there are no longer constraints 
that force them to maximize the benefits to cooperation. The very motivation for 
organization, to attain optimal scale in the face of competition, loses its salience under 
monopsony.  Instead, local monopsony protection empowers rent-seeking managers to 
exploit their growers by forcing members to accept payments lower than the 
counterfactual competitive equilibrium price.   
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4.3 Literature Review 
 Several authors have investigated the cause and consequence of ‘election 
capture’ by rent-seeking individuals in various settings.  Besley and Pratt (2004) 
develop a model in which government officials can bribe media outlets, who are privy 
to signals of the officials’ type and can convey this information to the voting public, in 
order to suppress any negative information. Given the degree of commercialization of 
the media, the level of transactions costs between government and the media, and the 
rents to holding political office, an equilibrium of media capture and thus control of 
political outcomes can result.  Besley and Burgess (2002) also use the media as a 
source of information that can force governments to be more accountable by creating a 
better informed constituency.  The basic idea in these models is that voters who have 
more accurate knowledge of candidates’ positions and policies are more likely to elect 
officials who are more responsive to their collective needs.  This paper differs by 
showing that where candidates can bribe voters directly, a corrupt elected leadership 
equilibrium can occur even when voters have full knowledge of the candidates’ types.  
Put differently, our model relaxes the informational assumptions of Besley and his co-
authors while achieving similar results. 
 Member heterogeneity is often highlighted as a reason why collective 
agreements break down.  Bardhan and Singh (2004), for example, investigate the 
relationship between the likelihood of cooperation and the level of inequality in the 
distribution of private assets.  They show that while infinitely repeated games 
supported by trigger strategies can sometimes overcome moral hazard problems, 
increasing levels of within-group inequality reduces the degree to which cooperation 
can be sustained.  In a paper that is similar in focus to ours, and whose framework we 
borrow, Banerjee et al. (2001) present a theory of rent-seeking in sugar cooperatives 
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whereby differences in the control rights of cooperative management favoring larger 
land owners and the homogenous pricing of cane to all farmers leads to inefficiency. 
 In this paper we argue that even within a homogenous population facing 
perfect information, corruption can still thrive.  Herein lies the significant departure of 
this paper from the extant literature.  The literature has thus far overlooked how the 
very act of creating a membership based organization (MBO) can give rise to 
incentives that result in the differentiation of otherwise homogenous populations.  
Leadership opportunities that favor those with managerial skill, entrepreneurial 
proclivity, political finesse, etc. provide members endowed with the requisite aptitudes 
the opportunity to advance their personal agendas.  As the returns to leadership or 
management positions grow, the incentive for rent-seekers to manipulate MBO 
elections in their favor also increases.  Once elected, they can then exploit the 
situation, doing just what is necessary to placate members while maximizing personal 
benefit. 
 In our model, unlike preceding ones, the “elite” are ex-ante indistinguishable 
among the group but benefit as a result of the process that triggered their latent, 
context-specific (and in this new context, valuable) endowments that allows them to 
manipulate the process to their benefit making them ex-post “elites”.  This occurs in 
spite of complete information for all group members. 
 Following Okada (1993), we use an n-person prisoners’ dilemma structure to 
investigate the possibility of cooperation among homogenous, fully informed and self-
interested individuals.  The institution that we model is based on the coffee 
cooperatives in Kenya but is easily generalizable to most producer organizations 
owned by members and managed by a board of directors democratically elected from 
the membership.   
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4.4 Model 
4.4.1 Members 
 The cooperative is defined as a provider of intermediary services for N 
member growers in its proximity.  All N growers in the area must channel their output 
through the cooperative, which has the technology to extract coffee beans from coffee 
cherry.  Participation is exogenous and there is no competition.  We assume 
homogeneous members who have similar endowments and are subject to the same 
constant returns to scale production technology.  Coffee cherry is produced from land 
and labor, a variable input that is available at a fixed wage.  We denote l as the labor 
input per unit land, and f(l) as the cherry production function per unit area planted in 
coffee.  f(l) is a twice differentiable and strictly concave function that satisfies 
0)(' >lf and 0)('' <lf  for all l > 0.  If p represents the price growers receive for 
coffee, then each member’s problem is given by wllpfMAX
l
−)( . Let *l satisfy 
wlpf =)(' * , reflecting the optimal labor input at the price p.   
4.4.2 Cooperative 
 The cooperative takes the output provided by all members, converts coffee 
cherry into coffee beans and sells it on the market at the competitive price *p .  For 
simplicity, we assume a one to one conversion of cherry to bean37.  As such, total sales 
for the cooperative are given by )(lNfQ ≡ .  Letting F denote the fixed operating costs 
faced by the cooperative, and vQQv =)(  represent its variable costs, the total profit is 
given by 
FQpvp −−−=Π ][ * .                              (1) 
                                                 
37 The actual mean conversion rate of coffee cherry to coffee beans is given at 7:1 
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The price, p, paid to members is set at the discretion of an official elected by the 
members in a democratic process.38 
4.4.3 Voting 
 We present two candidates who compete in an election to manage the 
cooperative.  We assume one candidate to be benevolent and his opponent to be a 
corrupt opportunist.  The benevolent candidate upholds the spirit of cooperation and 
chooses p to maximize farmer payments.  The corrupt candidate, on the other hand, is 
a rent seeker who chooses p to maximize his own benefit and may offer bribes to 
members in an effort to buy their vote.  We assume members to be rational and to 
perfectly observe the type of each candidate prior to casting their vote.  A candidate 
wins an election if he secures a majority of the vote.  We now show that there exist 
circumstances in which rational voters will elect the corrupt candidate who they know 
will skim money from the cooperative and thus depress the price p that they receive 
for their cherry. 
4.4.4 The Benevolent Candidate 
 As the benevolent candidate maximizes farmer payments subject to the profit 
constraint, he will set p to maximize aggregate social profit which is given 
by ])([ wllpfN − .  It follows that the efficient price is such that p = p* - v i.e., all 
                                                 
38 As formulated, we do not allow cooperatives to channel any of their revenues into productive 
investment.  Accommodating investments would require a dynamic model.  This would raise the 
possibility of corrupt officials offering higher payments than benevolent officials by splitting funds 
targeted for investments between personal rents and increasing payments to pacify members and win 
their support.  Nevertheless, unless corrupt officials could manipulate member information on the 
expected returns on investments, the optimal distribution of revenues between payments and 
investments under a benevolent candidate should continue to hold even under a corrupt leadership.  As 
such, limiting ourselves to a static model free of investment options does not weaken our results.  
Furthermore, for the specific context of Kenyan Coffee Cooperatives, abstracting from investment 
options is not far removed from reality.  None of the cooperatives visited show any evidence of a 
tendency to invest.  
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profits will be distributed equally across members.  Should the members elect the 
benevolent candidate, they are assured of receiving this price. 
4.4.5 The Corrupt Candidate 
 Given that the corrupt candidate is an opportunist and would like to use the 
power of elected office to capture more than his fair share of the collective profits, the 
only way he can extract rents is to reduce the price p offered to growers below the 
socially optimal price set by his opponent and to retain the remaining profits.39  
However, in order to win a majority of the votes, the corrupt candidate must offer 
voters an incentive to induce them into accepting the lower product price they know 
he will set.  We model this incentive by allowing the corrupt candidate to offer bribes 
to voters in return for their vote.  The bribing mechanism that we employ is a one-shot 
homogenous offer given simultaneously and independently to voters who must decide 
to reject or accept the offer without consultation with other voters or any knowledge of 
their decisions.  The setup is akin to an n-player noncooperative prisoner’s dilemma 
and will be shown to result in a similar coordination failure in which equilibrium 
outcomes leave all players worse off than they would otherwise be if they jointly 
chose the socially efficient course of action. 
 Let 0>α denote the minimum bribe the candidate must pay to any one voter 
to secure his or her vote.  Let  n = {1,2,…,N} be the set of members.  Every member i 
∈  N, once offered a bribe, can choose either to accept the bribe {Ai} or to reject it 
{Ri}.  The payoff to member i is not only a function of his decision, but also of the 
decisions of all other members in the cooperative.  Let the payoff to member i be 
represented by the function 
                                                 
39 Only by reducing p, can the cooperative itself make positive profits.  As we assume that the 
cooperative’s elected official is fully in charge of the treasury, any positive profits will be siphoned off 
by a opportunistic, rent-seeking candidate. 
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),,( hbg ii    bi = Ai or Ri,   h = 0, 1,…., N-1                                 (2) 
where ib  is player i’s action and h is the number of other members who reject the 
bribe offer.  The co-op elects the candidate receiving a majority (i.e, at least N/2) 
votes.40  We sometimes omit the subscripts indicating players if no confusion arises.   
 Let Ap  denote the price paid to growers when a majority accept the bribe and 
the corrupt candidate is voted in and Rp  be the price paid when they reject the bribe 
and elect the benevolent candidate.  Note that vpp AR −=  is the socially efficient 
price and thus Rp > Ap  and )()( AR lflf > .  The following characterizes all possible 
outcomes given various combinations of the players voting decisions. 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
≡+−=+
≡−=≥∀
),()()1,(
),()(),(
2 RAGwllfphAg
RRGwllfphRg
h
RRR
RRRN α                 (3) 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
≡+−=+
≡−=−≤∀
),()()1,(
),()(),(
12 AAGwllfphAg
ARGwllfphRg
h
AAA
AAAN α                      (4) 
),( MbG i is a simplified version of the payoff function where M=R if 2N  members or 
more reject the offer of α , and AM =  if less than 2N  reject it.  Figure 4.4 below 
presents a graphical representation of the payoff functions and their relative ranking. 
2
N
payoffs
F(A,R)
F(R,R)
F(A,A)
F(R,A)
h
α
α
G(A,A)
G , )
G(A,R)
G(R, )
 
Figure 4.4:  Individual Payoffs as a Function of Aggregate Voting Patterns 
 
                                                 
40 For simplicity, assume that if the vote is tied, the corrupt candidate wins. 
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Due to the fact that this is an election game with majority rules, outcome/payoffs 
being different depending on who wins, the n-person prisoner’s dilemma is not 
defined across all strategy sets.  Around the threshold the otherwise dominated 
strategy dominates.  It is clear from Figure 4 that A is clearly a dominant strategy in 
almost all cases.  This regularity breaks down however, when 2Nh = .  More formally, 
),(),( 22 NN RgAg < , but ),(),( hRghAg >  for all 2Nh ≠ . 
4.4.6 Equilibrium Outcomes 
 We first look for the pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) that will result in 
the corrupt candidate being elected.  It is straightforward to see that only two PSNE 
exist, one in which all individuals accept the bribe, i.e., Abi =  for all Ni∈ , and the 
other which has exactly one more than half of the membership rejecting the bribe, and 
the rest accepting it, i.e., Rbi =  and 12* += Nh .   
 Nevertheless, these results are not very interesting as the likelihood that an 
individual accepts a bribe is independent of how much the bribe is, or of other 
parameters such as the size of the cooperative that are likely to be taken into 
consideration in the decision making process.  As the probability that one is a pivotal 
voter increases, and as the opportunity cost of electing the corrupt candidate increases 
relative to the bribe price, one would intuitively imagine that the second equilibrium, 
in which the minimum number of voters needed to elect the benevolent candidate 
reject the bribe, is more likely to result.  Furthermore, as the corrupt candidate is 
footing the bill for the bribe price, it would be reasonable to assume that he would 
want to make the smallest total payoff sufficient to win the election.  As such, he 
would only want to pay off exactly half the voters. 
 To find the bribe price per voter that is needed to get exactly half the 
membership to accept the bribe, we look for a mixed strategy nash equilbria (MSNE) 
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that has the probability of rejecting a bribe )1,0(∈t  as a function of α ,pA, pR, and N.  
This will allow us to conduct comparative statistics so as to identify the set of 
conditions under which a corrupt candidate is likely to be elected.  To find the MSNE, 
it has to be that the rejection possibility is determined such that every player is 
indifferent as to rejecting or accepting the bribe if all other players follow the solution 
strategy. 
 Let ),...,( 1 Nbbb =  be any MSNE point where )]1(,[ ttbi −= for all Ni∈ .  
Then, by definition of MSNE, for all Ni∈  it must be that, ( ) ( )AbgRbg ii ** =                                          (5) 
where R
b* and A
b* are the strategy combinations obtained from b* if bi* is replaced 
with bi=R and bi=A respectively. 
When bi=R, 
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When bi=A, 
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Let ( ) 1`1 )1( −−− −⋅= hNh
h
N ttJ  be the binomial distribution for the probability t of h other 
members rejecting the bribe out a total N-1 possible rejections.  Then equation (5) can 
be rewritten as  
∑∑∑∑
−≤≤+≤≤−≤≤−≤≤
⋅+⋅=⋅+⋅
11
22
01
2
1
2
0
),(),(),(),(
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2
1 )1( −− −⎟⎟⎠
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⎜⎜⎝
⎛= NN
N
N ttB  and rearranging, we find 
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Simplifying further yields 
∑
−≤≤
−=−
10
)],(),([
Nh
BJAAGRRGB αα .                     (10) 
Recall that J represents the probability that h/N members reject a bribe where the a 
priori probability of an individual rejecting the bribe is given by t.  As such, it is clear 
that ∑
−≤≤
=
10
1
Nh
J , as we are summing all possible values of h across the entire 
distribution.  This leaves us with the following condition 
*)],(),([ α=− ARGRRGB                                                    (11) 
Equation (11) is key to our model. *α can be interpreted as the bribe that a candidate 
must offer in order that no more than 2N  members reject it when all members are 
playing the mixed strategy )]1(,[ ttbi −= for all Ni∈ .  It is the amount at which the 
expected benefit of rejecting the bribe and forming the minimum coalition to block the 
corrupt candidate from election is at least as large as the gain from deviating.  
Expanding equation (11) into its component parts, we have: 
[ ])()()()1(),,,( 122
2
1*
ARAARR
NN
N
N
AR llwlfplfpttNtpp −−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= −−α           
(12) 
 We use this formulation of the of the bribe price to derive the set of conditions under 
which a corrupt manager equilibrium will arise.  We set up the corrupt candidate’s 
problem as 
AAApY
wllfpYMax
A
−+ )(
,
    (13) 
subject to 0*2)(][ ≥−−−− αNYFlNfpp AAR     (14) 
where Y denotes the amount of cooperative profits that the corrupt manager would 
extort.  His total welfare, represented by equation (13) is thus a function of the amount 
of Y he is able to steal and, as he is also a member of the cooperative, the returns to his 
cherry production Ap , both variables that he chooses in order to maximize his welfare 
given the incentive compatibility constraint he faces in equation (14).  The constraint 
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is made up of net cooperative profits from coffee sales less fixed costs, the rents 
captured by the manager, and the aggregate bribe price paid.  It reveals the tension that 
arises from the dual sources of money the corrupt candidate receives.  On the one 
hand, he has an incentive to set the payment Ap  for cherry as high as possible as the 
total output, and thus revenue, is an increasing function of the payment received.  On 
the other hand, a desire to extract the maximum rents means setting Y as high as 
possible.  However, it is clear from equation (14) that any marginal increase in Y must 
result in a decrease in Ap .  Any equilibrium will necessarily involve positive amounts 
of both variables. Ap  must be positive or no profit will be realized and thus, not only 
will the corrupt manager have no resources to steal, he also will not recoup his spent 
bribe funds.  However, Y must also be positive as the manager would be the sole 
beneficiary of this income, while the same amount distributed to the membership in 
the form of a payment increase will generate only a fraction of the welfare to him.  
Note also that this implies that Ap  is strictly less than Rp . 
 To solve the model we first substitute )(* Rpα  from equation (12) into the 
constraint.  Suppose then that the constraint does not bind.  In this case, it must be that 
all first derivatives are zero.  But taking the derivative with respect to Y gives 1=0 
which is a contradiction.  As such the constraint must bind and we can thus solve it for 
Y* which yields 
)(2))(()(
**
AAAAR pNFplfNppY α⋅−−⋅−= .     (15) 
 The first term of equation (15) represents the total amount that a corrupt 
manager would skim off collective profits with the last term accounting for the total 
bribe price paid.  As the corrupt candidate requires 50% of the vote to be elected, he 
will rationally only buy the minimum necessary for voting.  Plugging equation (15) 
into the objective function, our candidate only has to choose Ap to solve 
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)())(()(2))((][
*
AAAAAAAAARp
plwplfppNFplfNppMax
A
⋅−⋅+⋅−−⋅− α .                    
           (16) 
Due to the strict concavity of (.)f  and (.)l , it is clear that the objective function is 
also strictly concave in Ap  and that a solution therefore exists.  This, however, simply 
means that if a candidate chooses to win office by buying votes there will exist a 
payment level that will allow him to recover the funds he spent to win the election 
with a positive remainder that he can pocket.  However, for a self-interested corrupt 
co-operative member to make the decision to stand for election, it must be the case 
that doing so would weakly improve his welfare. This requires that the following 
condition be satisfied 
)())(()())((* RRRAAA pwlplfppwlplfpY −≥−+                               (17) 
To investigate the likelihood that the above inequality holds, we expand and rearrange 
it to yield 
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AAAR ttN
llwplfpplfp
plfNpp                       (18) 
Equation (18) indicates that for a corrupt manager equilibrium to exist, the ratio of the 
total stolen from collective profits to the welfare loss due to reduced coffee payments 
has to be larger than one plus the probability of being the swing voter multiplied by 
the minimum number of voters needed to win the election - in this case N/2 .  Given 
that AR pp >  and thus )()( AR plpl > and ))(())(( AR plfplf > , and since (.)f  is 
strictly concave, it must be that 
)()(()(())(()(2 ARAARRAAR llwplfpplfpplfpp −−−>−  and thus for any 2≥N , 
the left hand side of equation (18) is greater than one and increasing in N.  To 
investigate the behavior of the right hand side, we turn to the Figure 4.5 below. 
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Figure 4.5:  Probability of Being a Swing Voter + 1 
 
 As Figure 4.5 shows, the right hand side of equation (18) decreases 
asymptotically towards one in N for all possible values of t.  Given that the left hand 
side is strictly increasing in N, it must be the case that there exists a threshold number 
of members above which it is always welfare improving for a corrupt candidate to 
bribe his way into office. Moreover, the benefits to capture increase as the cooperative 
gets bigger. The threshold, however, is a function of t and it is clear from the plot that 
a value of t around its mid-range has a much higher threshold than the extremities of t.  
Figure 4.6 below shows the effect of changes in t on the likelihood of being a swing 
voter holding N=10. 
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Figure 4.6:  Probability of Being a Swing Voter + 1 (N=10) 
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 Interpreting t as a proxy to a norm of integrity or commitment to the collective 
spirit of the cooperative, Figure 6 is quite telling.  Assuming that a value of t close to 
zero indicates strong norms of integrity where individuals are a priori unlikely to 
accept a bribe and a value close to one indicates a lack of collective commitment. This 
result then says that the cooperative is more likely to fall into the hands of a corrupt 
manager where norms are stronger, regardless of which norm prevails.  This goes 
against the dominant view that strong norms are unambiguously more conducive to 
efficient outcomes in collective settings.  Here, a social commitment against 
corruption actually serves to facilitate personal deviation from the norm.  Individuals 
offered bribes in such a setting perceive that the likelihood of being the pivotal voter is 
relatively low because others are not generally disposed to accepting bribes.  
Ironically, because they are then willing to accept a lower price to sell their vote, it 
becomes easier for a corrupt candidate to buy his way into office. 
4.4.7 Comparative Statistics 
 Having shown that a corrupt manager equilibrium exists and is likely to occur 
under very general conditions, we now move on to equilibrium price response to 
changes in key variables.  Differentiating equation (16) with respect to Ap  gives 
0)('))(()('))((')('2
))(()('))(('][
* =⋅−+⋅⋅+⋅−
⋅−⋅⋅−
AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAR
plwplfplplfppN
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Substituting in AA pwlf /)( =′  and simplifying yields 
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where from equation (12), 
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Substituting this back into the first order conditions gives 
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While we cannot solve equation (22) explicitly for Ap , we invoke the implicit 
function theorem that allows us to investigate the behavior of Ap  as various 
parameters change.  For simplicity, let ⎟⎟⎠
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differentiating equation (22) thus yields 
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As ),( tNZ  represents a probability, it is clear that )1,0()1,0(),( ∈∀∈ ttNZ  and all 
N>0.  However, given the discrete nature of the combinatoric term, the 
derivative ),()0,1( tNZ is not defined.  We deal with this by using the gamma function 
which is a generalization of the factorial to real number arguments where 
)!1()( −=Γ NN .  This allows us to solve for ),()0,1( tNZ .  Appendix 1 provides a more 
formal definition of the gamma function as well as the derivation of the following 
results:  
)1,0(0),()0,1( ∈∀< ttNZ >0 and all N>0,                                        (24) 
)23
2,0(0),()1,0( −∈∀> NNttNZ  and all N>0 and 0),()1,0( <tNZ  otherwise. 
With this result we can solve equation (23) to explore a relationship of interest by 
setting the derivatives of variables we want static at zero and rearranging to attain the 
solution.  As such we are able to get the following results: ( )
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 Equation (25) describes the effect that an increase in the size of the cooperative 
has on the payments growers receive for their cherry conditional on a corrupt 
management.  Given the result in equation (24) it is clear that the numerator is 
positive.  Moreover, since we know that AR pp > , and 0)( <′′ Apl  by assumption, the 
denominator is also positive thus yielding a positive relationship between cooperative 
size and level of payment.  This is an interesting result given that we earlier showed 
that the benefits of capture are also increasing in N.  Essentially, this results from the 
fact that each additional member reduces the probability of being the swing voter by 
larger than NN )1( −  such that the total bribe cost falls despite having to pay more 
individuals.  The corrupt candidate thus distributes the extra slack between slightly 
increasing the payment to members cherry as well as the amount he siphons such that 
he maximizes his total gain. 
 Equation (26) captures the payment response to increases in the a priori 
likelihood that the voting strategy favors accepting the bribe.  By equation (24) we 
know that the relationship will be negative for all )23
2,0( −∈ NNt  and positive for 
all )1,23
2( −∈ NNt .  This result also turns on the direct effect that changes in t have 
on the total bribe price.  Where t is close to zero, signifying a mixed strategy that 
heavily favors rejecting the bribe, it is actually much cheaper for the corrupt candidate 
to buy votes as the likelihood that any individual voter will swing the election 
outcome is extremely low.  As t gets larger and the apriori likelihood that any one 
candidate is picked becomes more balanced, the total bribe cost increases due to the 
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heightened possibility that any single voter could affect the election outcome.  As 
such, needing to recoup an increasing cost of victory, the corrupt manager thus 
reduces the payment he offers members.  However, as t approaches one, the falling 
probability that any individual swings the vote again drops the total bribe price and the 
payments thus increase. 
 Equation (27) investigates the relationship between changes in the opportunity 
cost of labor and payments, a relationship that we find to be negative.  If wages were 
to increase resulting in a shifting of labor away from coffee production and into wage 
labor, total cooperative output and thus net profits would decrease.  Facing a shrinking 
pie, the manager must thus increase his relative share of the pie to minimize the 
resulting decrease in the returns to corruption.  This result suggests the possibility of a 
dynamic cycle that can sink a captured cooperative.  Suppose relative wages increase 
as the returns to coffee production decreases. Labor time devoted to coffee would 
decline and aggregate production would thus fall as would total revenues.  To buffer 
their rents from these cuts, rent-seeking managers lower payments to farmers even 
further.  Farmers can be expected to respond by cutting back further on the labor time 
dedicated to coffee.  The vicious cycle thus continues. 
 Thus far, the model corresponds well with the general trends in the smallholder 
cooperative industry.  We have shown that under institutional circumstances similar to 
those that underlie coffee cooperatives in Kenya, corruption can very easily take root 
among the leadership.  Plenty of anecdotal evidence indicates that rent-seeking in 
cooperatives is indeed widespread.  The model implies that rent-seeking results in a 
drop in payments to farmers and production.  With these analytical results in hand, we 
move on to the empirical analysis and ask how well our model holds up against actual 
data at the cooperative level.   
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4.5  Data Analysis 
4.5.1. Data 
 The data were collected over a three month period between November 2003 
and February 2004.  The effort was part of a larger study of the institutional 
arrangements in the smallholder coffee, tea and dairy sub-sectors in Murang’a District 
of Central Kenya, a high potential agricultural area on the eastern slopes of the 
Aberdare ranges endowed with good soils and favorable rainfall.   
 In order to capture variation at the institutional level, our sampling method was 
stratified.  We first identified coffee cooperatives, dairy cooperatives and tea factories 
in Murang’a, collected institutional data at this level, then randomly sampled their 
members for further in-depth, farm level surveys.  About 60 percent of the sample 
grow coffee, 30 percent tea, and about 70 percent have one or more dairy cattle - with 
obvious overlaps. 
 For the purposes of this study, we utilize the sub-sample of households that 
were affiliated with a coffee cooperative.  We picked nine out of a total 19 coffee 
cooperatives in the District, purposively selecting the cooperatives so as to achieve the 
greatest variation in spatial coverage of Murang’a, cooperative size, and subjective 
performance based on information from the District Cooperative Officer, the District 
Agricultural Officer, and recent payments offered to members for their output.  Once 
the cooperatives were selected, we randomly picked a factory (or more for the larger 
cooperatives) and from that randomly selected our household sample from the register 
of members41. 
                                                 
41 Depending on their size, cooperatives in our sample had between 1-12 factories.  Given the difficulty 
in accessing selected members in the rainy season of Kenya’s hilliest and most mudslide prone District 
over seasonal roads, it became too restrictive to randomly survey at the cooperative level as opposed to 
the factory level.  Furthermore, the per cooperative sample sizes would have been too small to capture 
any inter factory differences.  To cater to the possible bias of selecting respondents from one or two 
factories, we collected basic statistics from each factory. 
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 At the institutional level, our collection efforts were hampered by a lack of 
available information, secrecy on the part of the managers, and a general 
unwillingness to provide the information sought.  While we had initially planned to 
collect information on prices paid to farmers, costs of operation, mark-ups, prices 
received from auctions, services offered to farmers, fees charged for services, structure 
and duration of contracts, feasible number of prospective contractors, etc. for the past 
couple of years,  we were unable to get a full set of responses from most cooperative 
managers.  Thankfully, the farm level surveys were relatively successful and we 
recovered a lot of useful data.  We recorded information on inputs and costs of 
production, credit access and use, farm size, area under coffee, other farm enterprises, 
social organizations involved in, extension services received, and fertilizer use among 
others.  Table 4.3 below presents some general statistics of the cooperatives. 
   
Table 4.3:  Descriptive Statistics for Sampled Cooperatives 
Cooperative 
Name 
Number 
of 
Members 
Sampled42 
Number 
of 
Factories 
Owned 
Total 
Number 
of 
Members 
Average 
Yield 
(Kgs/Tree) 
Payment 
(Ksh) per 
Kilo of 
Cherry43 
Coeff of 
Variation 
Of Pay 
Across 
Factories 
Kamacharia 18 4 3760 1.94 4.82 0.43 
Gaturi 48 5 3752 1.97 3.97 0.80 
Weithaga 20 4 2101 2.51 3.27 0.22 
Kanyenyaini 15 2 1249 2.96 7.68 0.18 
Kahuhia 50 6 3704 1.35 1.41 0 
Iyego 36 12 7000 2.33 5.27 6.35 
Kiru 19 4 2837 1.12 4.51 0.16 
Kangunu 21 1 1320 3.54 15.85 - 
Kiriti 20 3 2085 1.66 7.99 0.10 
 
                                                 
42 For various reasons beyond our control, e.g. Gaturi was close to a dairy cooperative whose sampled 
members were largely also New Gaturi members, difficulties in access etc., the per cooperative 
sampling proportions are quite different.  To correct for this, we use cooperative level weights where 
necessary. 
43 All prices quoted herein and through this section are deflated to 1998 prices using the mean national 
CPI index published by the Central Bank of Kenya. 
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 As Table 4.3 shows, there is considerable variation among the cooperatives 
along every dimension.  Cooperative size as defined by the total number of active 
members varies from Kanyenyaini with 1249 members to Iyego which has roughly 
7000.  Kangunu, which is only marginally bigger than Kanyenyaini and is the only 
society with a single factory, also has the highest sample average yield of 2.99 
kilograms of cherry per tree, more than five times that of Kamacharia which trails in 
coffee yield at a mere 0.56.  The largest variation, however, occurs in the payments 
farmers receive from their respective factories. Kangunu, which paid its members Ksh 
15.85 in the 2002/2003 season, paid more the ten times the amount that Kahuhia 
growers received. The payments, collected from cooperative records, are given as 
averages across all factories belonging to the cooperative.  All members are paid at the 
factory level with payments varying among factories within any one cooperative due 
to quality and quantity of coffee produced.  The standard deviation of payments across 
factories, normalized by their respective means, is given in the final column.  Note that 
Iyego posts a higher normalized standard deviation than its mean, suggesting that 
some members must have been receiving negative payments.  This is indeed true for 
several factories where a negative payment simply means that not only did the farmers 
attached to those factories receive no payments for the 2002/2003 season, but they 
were additionally burdened with debt that carried forward into the next season. 
4.5.2 Empirical Strategy 
 Our goal is to test for the presence of rent-seeking behavior in cooperatives and 
to show that, to the extent it exits, it has an inverse relationship to farm level technical 
efficiency.  Diminishing efficiency is a stricter measure of the negative consequence 
of rent-seeking as it goes beyond merely asking if total output or yields have 
decreased - a trend that has already be shown to exist in the aggregate. A decline in 
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output itself is not necessarily a signal of weak performance and could simply suggest 
that other livelihood options/alternatives began to yield higher returns and members 
were shifting their resources accordingly.  Falling output may thus reflect a rational 
shift in aggregate production patterns in response to changes in the expected returns of 
available livelihood options.  As such, in our empirical investigation, we impose a 
more stringent condition, seeking to identify a statistically significant association 
between farm-level technical inefficiency and corruption or mismanagement at the 
cooperative level.   
 The idea is that beyond declines in output, rent-seeking at the cooperative level 
that results in higher deductions from members’ payments and a reduction in the 
provision of services generates disincentives for members that are manifest in lower 
technical efficiency.  Growers associated with more corrupt cooperatives are likely to 
become disenchanted and reduce the effort they apply to the production of coffee.  By 
controlling for observable inputs to production, the resulting measures of technical 
efficiency proxies, to some extent, for the unobservable level of effort.  If measures of 
cooperative corruption and mismanagement are associated with low levels of technical 
efficiency, then it is possible to attribute part of the poor performance of cooperatives 
to infiltration by rent-seeking board members. 
 To tease this out from our data, we conduct three separate but interrelated tests.  
First, we estimate a stochastic production frontier for coffee yield and use the results 
to generate a farmer-specific measure of technical (in)efficiency.  We then conduct 
two separate factor analyses to extract proxies that together provide an indication of 
the likelihood and extent that the various cooperatives are involved with rent-seeking 
behavior.  The third test uses the efficiency measures generated from the frontier 
estimation as the dependent variable in an OLS regression aimed at determining the 
sources of technical (in)efficiency.  The rent-seeking proxies generated from the factor 
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analyses are here used as independent variables in an effort to gauge the relationship 
between cooperative level rent-seeking and individual member technical efficiency.   
4.5.3 Estimating Technical Efficiency 
 To investigate patterns of farm-level technical efficiency, we estimate a 
stochastic coffee production frontier then calculate each unit of observation’s 
deviation from this benchmark of optimal efficiency.  Stochastic production frontier 
models were introduced independently by Aigner, Lovell, Schmidt (1977) and 
Meeusen and van den Broeck(1977).  They provide estimators for the parameters of a 
linear model with a disturbance that is assumed to be generated from two separate 
processes: one that has a strictly non-negative distribution that parameterizes the 
inefficiency error term, and the other with a symmetric distribution to capture random 
error.  The following briefly summarizes the stochastic production frontier problem44.   
 Suppose firm i’s expected output qi is given by 
)exp(),( iiii vfq ξβz=         (28) 
where ),( βif z  denotes the production function, ]1,0(∈iξ  captures the degree of firm 
i’s technical efficiency where 1=iξ  signifies optimal production, and )exp( iv denotes 
random shocks to which firm i could be exposed.  Taking the natural log of equation 
(28) on both sides yields 
[ ] iiii vfq ++= )ln(),(ln)ln( ξβz         (29) 
Defining )ln( iiu ξ−= , assuming k inputs we estimate the following production 
frontier: 
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0 )][ln()ln()ln( γββ     (30) 
                                                 
44 Much of this section is drawn from Kumbhaker and Lovell (2000). 
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Since iu  is subtracted from )ln( iξ , restricting 0≥iu  implies that ]1,0(∈iξ  as 
specified above. 
 In estimating the frontier, we assume a normal distribution for the symmetric 
disturbance term and a half-normal for the distribution of the inefficiency term.  Table 
4.4 below provides summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation. 
 
Table 4.4:  Descriptive Statistics for Frontier Estimation Variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Coffee Yield* 2.04 1.96 0.16 7.5 
Plot Area* (acres) 0.56 0.49 0.00 3.00 
Land Area* (acres) 1.84 1.77 0.20 13.00 
Household Labor* (Days) 44.84 38.06 0 120 
Hired Labor* (Days) 29.37 38.35 0 112 
Age of Coffee Tree* 30.88 11.13 2 50 
Pre Harvest Damage* 26.73 32.29 0 95 
Inorganic Fertilizer (0=N, 1=Y) 0.234 0.424 0 1 
Organic Fertilizer (0=N, 1=Y) 0.447 0.498 0 1 
* Denotes variables used in natural log form in estimation.  For these variables, we followed the 
common practice of substituting 0.001 for zero-valued observations to log-transformations to be 
defined across the variables range.  Statistics presented for non-transformed variable.  
 Our measure of technical efficiency in coffee production is yield in kilos of 
coffee cherry per tree.  In order to minimize the influence of outliers, we truncated the 
yield variable by assigning all observations below the fifth percentile with the fifth 
percentile value and similarly constrain those above the 95th percentile to the 95th 
percentile45.  This results in a sample mean yield of 2.04 kilos of cherry per coffee 
tree.  Average acreage under coffee is calculated at 0.56 while average household total 
landholdings are several times larger at 1.84acres.  Household and hired labor use, 
specifically for coffee production, averages 44.8 man days and 29.4 man days per 
season, respectively. We include the age of the household’s coffee trees as a regressor 
                                                 
45 We performed similar transformations for both labor variables and the variable for tree age which all 
contained extreme outliers.  Without limiting the distribution in this manner, results were less precise 
and rendered insignificant parameter estimates for several variables that are otherwise significant. 
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to capture the physiological relationship between tree productivity and its age.  A 
relatively high average age of 31 years indicates a longstanding tradition of coffee 
production in the area.                                                    
 Pre-harvest damage refers to the estimated percent of total output that was lost 
pre harvest due to natural causes.  We recognize the potential endogeneity of this 
variable as it is likely to be correlated with plot-level managerial ability that also plays 
a role in determining technical efficiency.  However, pre-harvest damage also contains 
both exogenous components such as rainfall and pest infestation as well as quasi-fixed 
components such as plot slope (a key factor as Murang’a is Kenya’s hilliest District).  
Moreover, not accounting for this variable may significantly overestimate the 
technical inefficiency of farms struck by exogenous shocks directly impacting on 
yield.  By potentially understating technical inefficiency, we strengthen our final 
results.            
 Due to large variance in fertilizer application rates, a significant number of 
zeros, and a range of possible fertilizers to choose from, we constructed a single 
dummy variable for the use of both inorganic and organic fertilizers.  For inorganic 
fertilizers, we summed up the per kilo use of DAP, CAN, NPK, and MAP and created 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if use was above the fifth percentile of all non-zero 
observations and equal to zero otherwise.  In a similar manner, we constructed the 
dummy for organic fertilizer from use of farm yard manure and compost.  With this 
formulation, twenty-three percent and forty-five percent of our sample utilized 
inorganic and organic fertilizers respectively.                                                                                        
 Agricultural productivity depends heavily on agro-ecological and bio-physical 
conditions that are largely exogenous (Sherlund et. al, 2002).  In an attempt to capture 
the effects of agro-ecological variation on technical efficiency, we included farm-level 
altitude in the estimation.  However, after several different specifications all yielded 
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highly imprecise estimates that often increased the standard errors on the estimates of 
other model parameters, we opted to leave it out.  One possible explanation is that 
while altitude gradually but steadily increases form the Eastern border of Murang’a to 
its Western border at the foothills if the Aberdare Mountain Ranges, its very hilly 
terrain throughout results in rapid fluctuations of altitude across short distances, that 
could confound the mean effects. 
 Assuming that households in close proximity to each other are relatively likely 
to experience similar agro-ecological environments, we attempt to overcome this 
problem by specifying the inefficiency disturbance to be heteroskadastic across 
cooperatives.  This allows the model to capture cooperative specific differences in 
mean technical efficiency.  Apart from capturing productivity differences related to 
environmental conditions, heteroskadasticity across cooperatives will also control for 
inefficiency effects that arise from poor management at the cooperative level.  Among 
other things, this can include poor timing for the provision of time-sensitive inputs 
such as fertilizers, or credit needed to purchase various inputs (Hanchate, 1996), and 
political wrangling among the leadership or insecurity that results in effort-reducing 
distraction among workers (Barrett et. al, 2003). 
 We present the results of our frontier estimation in Table 4.5 below. 
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Table 4.5:  Stochastic Production Frontier Estimates 
Parameter Coefficient Std. Err. Parameter Coefficient Std. Err 
Constant  0.656 0.830 )ln(
2
vσ  *** -1.853 0.236 
Plot Size ** -0.256 0.103 )ln(
2
uσ     
Plot Size^2 *** -0.043 0.010 Kamacharia *** 1.996 0.758 
Land Size * -0.138 0.079 Gaturi *** 2.597 0.779 
Land Size^2  -0.050 0.039 Weithaga  0.025 0.805 
Household Labor  -0.003 0.024 Kanyenyaini ** 2.023 0.990 
Household Labor^2  0.008 0.007 Kahuhia *** 2.882 0.801 
Hired Labor *** 0.112 0.020 Iyego *** 2.067 0.803 
Hired Labor^2 *** 0.028 0.005 Kiru *** 3.199 0.799 
Tree Age ** 0.638 0.263 Kiriti *** 2.870 0.802 
Tree Age^2 ** -0.109 0.045 Constant ** -1.998 0.795 
Harvest Loss * -0.135 0.071     
Harvest Loss^2 ** -0.047 0.024     
Inorganic Fertilizers *** 0.658 0.112     
Organic Fertilizers  0.058 0.107     
        
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -28011.05 No. of Observations 207 
Wald chi2(14) 210.57 Prob > chi2 0.00 
*** - Significant at 99% level  ** - Significant at 95 % level  * - Significant at 90 % level 
 
 Results indicate that the total acreage of land available to the grower, the 
acreage under coffee, the amount of hired labor used in coffee production, the age of 
the coffee trees, the use of inorganic fertilizers and the estimated pre-harvest loss were 
all significantly related to the observed cherry coffee yield.  Given the log-quadratic 
specification, interpreting the results are not to straightforward.  To give a better sense 
of the estimated relationships, we compute farm-specific elasticities based on actual 
input levels and frontier parameter estimates.  Below, we show the kernel regression 
of the elasticity on variables of interest. 
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Figure 4.7:  Kernel Regression of Estimated Yield Elasticities With Respect to Variables 
of Interest 
 The plot size elasticity of yield is negative and decreasing across the whole 
range of plot size.  Essentially, this means that the optimal strategy is not to devote 
any land to coffee production.  Having controlled for total land holdings, increasing 
plot size under coffee implies a larger ratio of total land devoted to coffee.  This 
provides some evidence (albeit inconclusive) of allocative inefficiencies, suggesting 
that available alternatives for land-use are likely to be more productive.  A majority of 
farmers, disenchanted by the dismal returns to coffee, indicate that they have recently 
often neglected their coffee, tending to it minimally or intensively intercropping with 
beans, napier grass, maize etc. Since both the required effort and the opportunity costs 
of land increase with plot size, the larger the plot, the greater the incentives to 
intercrop and the tendency to reduce husbandry toward a low return crop.  Such a 
dynamic could also explain the negative plot size elasticity of yield. 
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 While yield response to inputs of hired labor does not follow the typical 
inverse-U trajectory, it seems to fit the particular context quite well.  Coffee 
production requires a minimum threshold of labor input for any positive level of 
output.  Pruning, weeding, collecting and transporting raw cherry to pulping stations 
are just some of the necessary tasks.  Furthermore, informal labor contracts of less 
than are day are very rare in Murang’a. Consequently, low inputs of hired labor can 
imply a high degree of underemployment as a laborer may be needed for several days 
throughout the season but be largely underemployed.  Nonetheless, as marginal labor 
inputs above the requisite minimum would only occur if current labor time is fully 
employed, labor elasticity of yield is positive at higher inputs of labor. 
 The estimated elasticity of yield with respect to tree age is quite intuitive.  As 
coffee trees age to maturity, here estimated at around 18 years, they increase in 
productivity.  However, once they reach maturity their productive capacity peaks and 
steadily declines thereafter. While this inverse-U age productivity relationship is 
expected of the physiological process, it is interesting to note that despite this fact, the 
uprooting of coffee trees was outlawed until 2002.  Furthermore, there is no 
mechanism within cooperatives that attempts to correct for this by initiating a scheme 
to facilitate smallholder farmers’ replacement of old trees with new ones. As such, the 
average age of the coffee trees in our sample is over 30, more than ten years past their 
prime.  The use of inorganic fertilizers, which has dramatically decreased in the recent 
past as most cooperatives are too heavily indebted to provide such inputs to its 
members, is strongly and significantly related to yields. 
 Our principal objective in estimating the production frontier was to obtain the 
estimates of grower technical efficiency within our sample. We included cooperative 
level dummies to control for heteroskedasticity in the inefficiency error term.  
Estimates for eight of the nine cooperative dummies are statistically significant 
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indicating that systematic differences in farm-level technical efficiency exits across 
cooperatives.  As presented in Table 4.5, the estimates are parameterized as the log 
variances of the error components. From these results, we can extract the farm-specific 
estimates of technical efficiency.  These estimates will later be used as the dependent 
variable for the test we run to look at the effect of corruption at the cooperative level 
on farm specific efficiency.  Table 4.6 below presents some descriptive statistics on 
the estimates of technical efficiency.   
 
Table 4.6:  Descriptive Statistics of Technical Efficiency Estimates 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Kamacharia 0.50 0.19 0.18 0.78 
Gaturi 0.46 0.25 0.04 0.86 
Weithega 0.75 0.06 0.66 0.87 
Kanyenyaini 0.59 0.21 0.07 0.84 
Kahuhia 0.39 0.24 0.04 0.80 
Iyego 0.54 0.21 0.10 0.85 
Kiru 0.26 0.17 0.06 0.57 
Kangunu 0.76 0.08 0.64 0.88 
Kiriti 0.42 0.28 0.05 0.88 
Total 0.50 0.25 0.04 0.88 
 
 What immediately stands out from these statistics is the large variation in 
technical efficiencies both within and between cooperatives.  Gaturi, whose mean 
efficiency is slightly less than the full sample average, has farmers posting technical 
efficiencies as low as four percent and as high as 86 percent of the optimal.   Kangunu 
and Kanyenyaini are the two most efficient cooperatives with an average efficiency of 
about seventy five percent of the optimal and very low standard deviations. Kiru, the 
least efficient, produces at an average rate of just twenty-six percent of the optimal.  
Across the whole sample, farmers post an average efficiency rate of fifty percent. 
 Though, for reasons previously explained, we use variations in technical 
efficiency to confirm the existence and consequence of rent-seeking behavior on 
cooperative performance, our analytical model made no explicit predictions of the 
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relationship between corruption and technical efficiency.  Instead, the model showed 
that where corruption was present, payments made to farmers would be relatively 
lower.  We further justify the use of technical efficiency as an indicator of rent-seeking 
activities by showing in, Figure 4.8, the relationship between payments and mean 
efficiency at the cooperative level. As expected, lower payments are associated with 
lower levels of efficiency.  The results suggest that technical efficiency can be used as 
a proxy for lower payments, whereby low levels of technical efficiency imply a 
greater likelihood of corruption amongst the cooperative leadership. 
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Figure 4.8:  The relationship between cooperative payments to farmers and their 
technical efficiency 
 
4.5.4 Creating Proxies Associated with Rent Seeking Behavior 
 The next step is to create proxies as indicators for the relative level of 
corruption and management incompetence between the cooperatives.  The idea is to 
identify and differentiate cooperatives by the likelihood that they are run by rent-
seeking or inept board members.  This is not a straightforward task as there is no direct 
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measure of corruption, nor would the cooperative management offer any information 
that may implicate them.  Moreover, our sample includes only nine cooperatives with 
a total of thirteen factories limiting any regression analysis we can use to generate the 
requisite proxies.   
 As such, we take a different approach, seeking to identify corruption within 
cooperatives indirectly by studying the outcomes and perceptions that are commonly 
associated with corruption or mismanagement.  It is important to note that with the 
data we have available, we are not able to differentiate between corruption or 
management incompetence.  Nevertheless, as the negative effect that either corruption 
or mismanagement has on member welfare is identical, we feel that making such a 
distinction is not crucial to our analysis or its implications.  Henceforth, we use 
corruption and mismanagement interchangeably.   
 Factor analysis, which is concerned with uncovering the latent structure of a 
set of variables, is well suited for our purposes.  Essentially, factor analysis uses the 
covariance matrix generated from a set of variables to find a smaller number of 
common factors that linearly reconstruct the original variables.  These common 
factors, depending on the weights they assign to the different variables (known as 
“loadings”), can then be interpreted as proxies for the common structure that they 
represent. 
 We use factor analysis to reduce a set of variables into common factors that 
correspond to various aspects of cooperative organization and practice that are likely 
to affect its productivity and are plausibly related to the degree of corruption plaguing 
the cooperatives.  We conduct two separate tests, extracting two underlying factors 
from each.  The first includes only factory level variables and aims at generating 
common factors that speak to the structure and performance of the cooperatives.  The 
second test includes farmer level variables that capture subjective perceptions of 
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cooperative effectiveness, and farmers’ confidence with cooperative policy makers 
and government officials.  
 Table 4.7 below defines the variables used in the first test and provides some 
basic statistics. 
 
Table 4.7:  Variables Used to Generate Size and Performance Factors for Cooperatives 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev 
payment total factory level payment (Ksh per kg of output) made to members for 2002/2003 season 5.52 3.98 
members number of active members per cooperative 3413 1738 
factories number of factories operated by cooperative 5.31 3.12 
payvariance coefficient of variation of intra-cooperative pay 0.31 0.4 
quality00 net value of coffee sales 2000 (ksh per kilo) 81.69 28.85 
quality99 net value of coffee sales 1999 (ksh per kilo) 76.68 8.03 
coopyield average cooperative yield for 2002/2003 season (kg per tree) 1.84 0.67 
 
 Payments to farmers, which are unique at the factory level, averaged a mere 
5.52 Kenya Shillings for the 2002/03 season.46   Cooperatives averaged 3412 active 
members and owned just over five factories on average. To capture the effect of 
externalities associated with variations in intra-cooperative factory payments, we 
include their coefficient of variation which as a mean value across cooperatives of 
0.31.  The net value of coffee sales, which is the factory specific price received at the 
Nairobi Coffee Auctions (where the vast majority of coffee is marketed) less 
marketing and milling costs, proxies for the quality of coffee produced.  We also 
include the average cooperative yield, which for the 2002/2003 was a paltry 1.84 kilos 
of cherry per tree.47 
  
  
                                                 
46 Recall that all prices and values are deflated to 1998 prices. 
47 As we will subsequently be using the factors generated from this analysis as explanatory variables in 
a regression with the extracted technical efficiency estimates as the independent variables, we exclude 
own yield from the average cooperative yield generated for each household.  This avoids the problem of 
spurious correlation that could arise since the technical efficiency estimates are also based on yields. 
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Table 4.8:  Results of Cooperative Size and Performance Factor Analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Proportion of Variance Explained 
Size 2.98 0.54 
Performance 1.70 0.31 
 
ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS 
Variable Size Performance Uniqueness 
members 0.97 -0.21 0.02 
factories 0.96 -0.19 0.04 
payvariance 0.90 0.16 0.15 
payment -0.22 0.87 0.19 
quality00 -0.04 0.58 0.66 
quality99 0.32 0.29 0.81 
coopyield -0.06 0.75 0.44  
 
 Table 4.8 presents the factor analysis results.  Of seven possible factors, we 
retain only two for extraction. There is no strictly defined procedure for determining 
the optimal number of factors to retain.  The decision often depends on a combination 
of a predetermined hypothesis and a sensible cut-off criterion; either a threshold 
eigenvalue above which factors are retained (commonly between zero and one), or a 
degree of variation that the first n factors must explain (commonly 90%).   
 The first factor, which we call size, seems to describe the cooperative size.  It 
loads heavily on members, factories, and variance of pay within the cooperative, 
which are all correlated with increasing size.    The low uniqueness posted by each of 
these variables, indicates that the underlying factor of size is well defined by these 
variables.  Uniqueness is defined as that fraction of variance for the variable that is not 
explained by the factors.  The second factor, which we call performance loads 
primarily on variables associated with the performance or productivity of the 
cooperative as given by the payments its members receive, the volume of output they 
produce and the quality of their coffee. As one would expect, and as indicated by the 
large on positive loadings of these variables on the performance factor, performance 
improves as payments, production and quality of coffee increase. 
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  Beyond the structural features of a cooperative that may determine the ease 
with which corruption takes root, or its relative performance, that may proxy for the 
extent of mismanagement or rent-seeking activity, members’ beliefs regarding the 
effectiveness of cooperative management could also reveal key information.  To 
investigate this possibility, we run a second factor analysis on the variables defined in 
Table 4.9.  In order to facilitate interpretation of the subsequent factor loadings, we 
include the variables’ response structure. 
 
Table 4.9:  Variables Used to Generate Members’ Perception and Confidence Factors 
Variable Definition Response Structure 
goodrelations members of the coop have generally good relationships with each other 1 
Caninfluence membership can influence decision making process 1 
profitdistribute membership understands how management distributes cooperative profits 1 
effectivemanage management is effective in running the cooperative 1 
coopcompare your cooperative is managed better than other coffee cooperatives in the region 1 
Insecurity this village/neighbourhood has a problem with insecurity and violence 1 
Localgovt local government officials can be trusted 1 
Centralgovt central government officials can be trusted 1 
Agofficer district agricultural officers do their best to improve the welfare of farmers 1 
Coopofficer district co-operative officers do their best to improve the welfare of farmers 1 
Creditaccess do you have access to money lending facilities 2 
empowerment are you able to make important decisions that could change the course of your life 3 
   
Response Structure  
1 1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 =  Neither; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Strongly Disagree   
2 1 = Yes; 2 = No;  
3 1 = Totally Unable; 2 = Largely Unable; 3 = Neither; 4 = Largely Able; 5 = Totally Able 
 
 Note that all the variables used for the second factor analysis are ordinal.  
While ordinality presents a theoretical problem for factor analysis, which is developed 
for continuous variables, methods created to account for ordinality have thus far 
proved to be largely computationally infeasible or impractical (Joreskog and 
Moustaki, 2001).  The limited set of methods that can incorporate ordinality into factor 
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analysis, known generally as the UBN (Underlying Bivariate Normal) approach, have 
proven to yield similar or only slightly better results compared to “standard” ordinal 
coding. Kolenikov and Angeles (2004), argue that the modest gains from using 
computationally intensive methods to control for ordinality are not sufficient to 
recommend its use.  Where the variables are mostly dummies, however, they show 
that not controlling for discreteness leads to significantly inferior results.  For 
completeness, we tried to correct for ordinality by using the polychoricpca function in 
STATA.  The two factors thus generated were difficult to interpret and furthermore, 
when they were introduced as variables in the technical efficiency estimate 
(substituting for the two factors, perception and confidence, generated without 
correcting for ordinality) the model’s R-squared dropped and neither factor was 
significant.  As such, we opted against controls for ordinality.   
 In Table 4.10 below, we present the results of the second factor analysis. 
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Table 4.10:  Factor Analysis of Members’ Perception and Confidence  
Factor Eigenvalue Proportion of Variance Explained 
Dissatisfaction 1.48 0.60 
Pessimism .82 0.33 
 
ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS 
Variable Dissatisfaction Pessimism Uniqueness 
goodrelations 0.23 0.04 0.95 
caninfluence 0.24 0.05 0.94 
profitdistribute 0.37 0.03 0.87 
effectivemanage 0.64 0.03 0.58 
coopcompare 0.61 0.00 0.62 
creditaccess 0.19 -0.06 0.96 
insecurity -0.22 -0.06 0.95 
coopofficer 0.40 0.32 0.73 
agofficer 0.24 0.40 0.78 
localgovt 0.05 0.56 0.68 
centralgovt -0.05 0.55 0.69 
empowerment -0.06 0.23 0.94 
 
 
 Again, we retain only the first two factors which together explain over 90% of 
the variance among the variables.  The first factor, dissatisfaction, loads heavily on 
variables that encompass subjective beliefs of how well the cooperative is managed.  
These include member ability to influence policy, member understanding of how 
cooperative resources are used, member ability to access credit and even member 
beliefs of the dedication of government cooperative officials to their job.  While the 
uniqueness levels of most of these variables are high, effectivemanage and 
coopcompare, which are closely related to our interpretation of the underlying factor, 
are associated with acceptable levels of uniqueness. As loaded, dissatisfaction 
increases as farmers are more likely to rate there cooperative as poorly managed, 
lacking in the provision of services, associated with violence and disengaged from the 
membership. As such, we would expect dissatisfaction to be negatively related to 
farmer technical efficiency.   
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 The second factor seems to represent a measure of pessimism in the regulatory 
environment or a lack of faith in the commitment of policy makers to improve 
cooperative performance. We call this factor pessimism.  It is instructive to note that in 
December 2002, about a year before the field work for this research took place, Kenya 
held a landmark national election that resulted in the first electoral transfer of power in 
the country’s history.  The sense of unbounded optimism and hope was palpable and 
permeated the whole country (Wolf et al., 2004)48. In conversations with our 
respondents, it was clear that some of this confidence remained.  Several respondents 
attributed their expectation of improved performance in the coffee smallholder sub-
sector to their confidence in the new government and its commitment to economic 
growth.  Such sentiment is likely to generate incentives for heightened productivity.  
Thus we expect a negative correlation between pessimism and technical efficiency. 
Note that the variable empowerment loads inconsistently on pessimism. Unlike the 
other variables, higher values of empowerment are associated with greater self-
assurance and should therefore load negatively on pessimism.  Nevertheless, with a 
uniqueness level of 0.94, the variable empowerment provides little information to the 
factor pessimism. 
4.5.5 Determinants of Farm-Specific Technical Inefficiency 
 The third empirical test regresses the farm-specific estimates of technical 
inefficiency, on a set of likely covariates, including the factors associated with various 
aspects of rent-seeking, in an attempt to determine the correlates of inefficiency.  
Table 4.11 below presents some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
regression. 
 
                                                 
48 Gallup International, in their annual end of year survey, ranked Kenya as the most optimistic country 
in December 2002. 
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Table 4.11:  Descriptive Statistics For Correlates of Inefficiency Regression 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gender (Male=1) 0.825 0.381 0 1 
Age (Years) 57.753 13.758 27 96 
Household Size 5.096 2.244 1 15 
Primary Education 0.332 0.472 0 1 
Secondary Education 0.328 0.470 0 1 
Post Secondary 0.057 0.232 0 1 
Experience (Years) 26.017 12.762 1 65 
Extension (Recv’d Ext in past 2 yrs=1) 0.320 0.467 0 1 
Advance Payment Ratio 2002 0.519 0.308 0.133 1.00 
Size 0.00 0.99 -1.12 2.32 
Performance 0.00 0.92 -1.46 2.09 
Dissatisfaction 0.00 0.81 -2.51 1.70 
Pessimism 0.00 0.75 -1.93 1.93 
 
 We control for the traditional household demographic variables in addition to 
experience (the number of years the household has been growing coffee), the receipt 
of extension services, as well as the ratio of advance payment to total payment 
received by members.    82% of households are male and the mean age for a 
household head is approximately 58.  Growing coffee is very much an established 
tradition in the area with the average household engaged in coffee production for over 
25 years.  The percentage of household heads that have completed either primary or 
secondary school stands roughly similar at 33%, but less then six percent of household 
heads have any post secondary schooling.  Only 32% of the households had been 
visited by an extension agent at least once in the past 2 years.  For the 2002/2003 
season, the average ratio of advance to total payments stood just above fifty percent.  
The advance ratio is defined as the fraction of total payment that is received as an 
advance at the start of the season49.  We include this variable as a proxy for liquidity. 
 Various hypotheses exist to explain the existence and direction of the 
relationship between the chosen demographic covariates and technical efficiency:  
                                                 
49 Recall that cooperatives pay their members in two installments.  A coffee advance payment (CAPS) 
at the beginning of the season, and a final payment at the end of the season. 
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Gender differentiation in farming activities, the inertia of older households to novel 
and superior farming practices, the benefits to specialization of roles accorded to 
larger households,  etc.  However, as these relationships are not the focus of this study, 
we remain largely agnostic of their role.  As extension services are an important 
service that cooperatives specifically provide their members to improve their 
productivity, we expect the receipt of such services to be positively associated with 
technical efficiency.  Furthermore, as advance payments would allow farmers to invest 
in quality inputs in a timely manner, we hypothesize a positive relationship with 
technical efficiency. 
 To test for the relationship between cooperative corruption and farmer 
technical efficiency, we include the four factors associated with different aspects of 
cooperative organization and performance that can be linked to the likelihood and 
extent of rent-seeking activity.  The actual values of these variables do not mean much 
and are here simply normalized to mean zero.  However, because the variables are 
cardinally ranked, the position of a given observation relative to the variable’s entire 
range is important.  Given that the variables loading heavily on both the size and 
performance factors are all positive,  and are all positively related to the underlying 
notion of cooperative size and performance (eg., more members and more factories 
likely signify a larger cooperative as larger payments to members and greater 
production indicates a better performing cooperative), higher values of these factors 
suggest bigger and more efficient cooperatives.  Dissatisfaction and pessimism, on the 
other hand, are both negative, increasing as members perceive greater management 
incompetence or have less confidence in policy makers.   
 Results are presented in Table 4.12 below. 
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Table 4.12:  Sources of Inefficiency Estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err 
Constant  0.239 0.285 
Gender  -0.024 0.049 
Age  0.003 0.010 
Age2  -1.1E-05 8.3E-05 
Household Size  0.001 0.008 
Primary Education  0.017 0.050 
Secondary Education  -0.021 0.056 
Post Secondary  0.001 0.082 
Experience  -0.001 0.006 
Experience2  -6.0E-06 1.0E-04 
Extension * 0.059 0.035 
Advance Payment Ratio 2002 *** 0.356 0.103 
Size * -0.031 0.017 
Performance *** 0.179 0.034 
Dissatisfaction * 0.037 0.022 
Pessimism * -0.040 0.023 
R-Squared  0.2069  
Number of Observations  197  
*** - Significant at 99% level     ** - Significant at 95 % level  
* - Significant at 90 % level 
 
 None of the demographic variables, including experience in coffee growing, 
prove to be significantly related to degree of efficiency.  A possible explanation is that 
some of these variables are related to the use and availability of inputs whose variation 
is already captured in the estimates of technical efficiency.  Household size, for 
example, is probably associated with the use of household labor and the demand for 
hired labor.  Experience, on the hand, is likely to be correlated with tree age. 
 The receipt of extension services, which we expected to be associated with 
greater levels of efficiency, does appear to have a statistically significant effect.  Given 
that the mean value of the technical efficiency estimates was a mere 0.50, the high 
value of the extension dummy’s estimated parameter emphasizes the importance of 
such services.  Receiving extension services at least once in the past two years 
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increases technical efficiency by slightly more than ten percent.  That a mere 32% of 
households have had extension visits in the past two years is further evidence of the 
deterioration of coffee cooperatives. 
 The fraction of the total payment given as an advance at the beginning of the 
season, a key policy variable, is strongly significantly and positively related to 
efficiency.  This points to the crucial importance of providing smallholder farmers, 
who are often cash constrained and have limited access to credit, with some form of 
advance payment on their output in order to facilitate the timely purchase of critical 
inputs such as inorganic fertilizers and pesticides.   
 The four cooperative-specific factors are all significantly associated with farm-
level technical efficiency.  As hypothesized, size is negatively associated with 
technical efficiency.  In our analytical model, we showed that the likelihood of 
election capture increased with increasing membership, a variable clearly related to a 
cooperatives size.  As such, this result could be interpreted as revealing a significant 
association between the probability that a cooperative has been captured by rent-
seeking officials and technical efficiency.  This finding can also be interpreted as 
suggesting decreasing returns to scale in cooperative production, a result that 
contradicts the unsupported claims of many policy makers who champion mergers in 
cooperatives on the basis of increasing returns to scale arguments.  The negative and 
significant result on pessimism lends further credence to our claims. Lack of 
confidence in policy makers resolve to improve the rules and regulations that underlie 
the smallholder coffee sector suggests a current institutional arrangement that does not 
provide growers with incentives that aptly reward productive behavior. 
 The only unexpected result regards the positive and significant relationship 
between dissatisfaction and efficiency.  Because dissatisfaction explained the least 
variation among the variables it loaded heavily on, it could be that our interpretation of 
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the latent variable captured in the variable dissatisfaction is somewhat imprecise.  An 
alternative explanation is that having controlled for cooperative performance, 
dissatisfaction may be picking up farmer-specific expectations of how cooperatives 
could be managed, which, in turn, is associated with a farmer’s understanding of the 
disparity between the status-quo and what is possible under optimal management.  
Such farmers, who are likely to be the most enterprising, would express the most 
discontent with management while still applying effort into their own production.                                    
 High values of performance, associated as it is with higher payments to 
farmers and increases in the quality and quantity of output, suggests a cooperative 
leadership that seeks to maximize member welfare and provide the right incentives for 
increased productivity.  Low values of performance, on the other hand, are more likely 
to be associated with the fleecing of cooperative revenues by the leadership and the 
neglect of administrative and management duties.  Indeed, our analytical model 
showed that cooperatives captured by a rent-seeking leadership would be 
characterized by lower payments to farmers and lower farmer output.  Cooperatives 
with low values of performance are thus more likely to be headed by corrupt or inept 
individuals.  As such, the sizable and strongly significant  relationship between 
performance and farmer efficiency also supports the hypothesis that rent-seeking at 
the cooperative level impacts negatively on farm level efficiency. 
 
  4.6  Discussion and Conclusion 
 For almost a decade now, the smallholder coffee sub-sector in Kenya has 
witnessed a significant deterioration in several key indicators.  Both yields and total 
output have declined, payments to farmers have plummeted, and the relative price of 
Kenya coffee in the world market has declined.  In this paper we investigated the 
relationship between this decline and changes in the laws governing cooperatives that 
  125
effectively shifted the managerial and administrative responsibility of running a 
cooperative onto its members.  We hypothesized that by giving cooperative board 
members unregulated access to the organization’s treasury, the new laws made 
leadership positions lucrative to potential rent-seekers and created incentives for 
corrupt and self-interested individuals to occupy the available leadership positions.  
The voting method used in the cooperative subsector facilitates the election of 
individuals known to be corrupt 
 In an analytical framework resembling the organizational structure of these 
cooperatives, we have shown that where managers are chosen from the membership, 
and where no regulatory oversight exists to curb election fraud or the embezzlement of 
collective profits, leadership positions are prone to capture by corrupt individuals who 
have a greater incentive to win elections than benevolent candidates.  Our results hold 
largely due to an implicit assumption that candidates can expect the individuals they 
bribe to honor their pledge to vote for them,  a valid assumption given the particular 
voting system employed by these cooperatives.  Once the cooperative is captured, we 
show that payments to farmers are set lower than they would otherwise be and that 
farmer productivity falls as a response.  We also find that contrary to the extant 
literature which lauds the value of strong norms in enhancing economic opportunity 
and returns in informal settings, strong norms also increase the likelihood that a 
corrupt candidate wins elections by decreasing the cost of buying votes.  This 
indicates the need for caution in designing membership based organizations that rely 
heavily on the strength of shared norms to act as a sufficient substitute for formal 
enforcement mechanisms.  
 The analytical results suggest several policy implications.  First, efforts need to 
be taken to ensure that politically savvy and self-interested individuals do not continue 
to manipulate elections.  A feasible step toward this end would be to require that 
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elections are carried out by secret ballot in the presence of objective cooperative 
elections supervisors. Second, in order to pressure cooperatives to operate efficiently 
and to provide growers with alternatives, growers should be allowed to sell their 
output to the highest bidder.  The current circumstance of coffee cooperatives presents 
a golden opportunity to make this shift into competitiveness, as the main justification 
for involuntary membership no longer applies.  When cooperatives used to provide 
their growers with credit, fertilizers, pesticides, extension advice, etc., requiring 
growers to sell their output to their respective cooperatives was a credible means to 
ensure repayment for services rendered and inputs provided.  As cooperatives today 
rarely provide these inputs or services, this argument is moot. Increased 
competitiveness, however, would require a legal system that can formally enforce 
contracts. 
 The empirical part of our study complements our analytical model. Evoking 
our analytical results that, ceteris paribus, larger cooperatives and those posting 
relatively low payments and low outputs are more likely to have been captured by 
rent-seeking individuals, we generate factors associated with these variables to rate 
cooperatives by the likelihood that their leadership is corrupt or inept.   We then 
estimate the effect that these factors have on farm-level technical efficiency and find 
that the same measures of cooperative structure, performance and member’ perception 
associated with increased rent-seeking are also significantly related to reduced 
technical efficiency.  In other words, the evidence suggests that corruption and 
incompetence among the governing board breeds disillusionment among members that 
manifests in declining technical efficiency.   
 Other key results confirm the significant and positive impact that fertilizers, 
pesticides, and extension services have on coffee yields.  Given the extremely low 
fertilizer and pesticide application rates evident in the sub-sector, and a weak 
  127
extension system, mechanisms designed to boost the use of these inputs could have a 
large, favorable impact on yields. 
 The main goal of organizing smallholder coffee growers into fully autonomous 
cooperatives was to create the economic conditions that would encourage their 
productive and marketing capacities.  Such an institutional infrastructure was designed 
to maximize the return to farmers’ efforts, increase their output and ultimately 
improve their welfare. Unfortunately the design has proved faulty and has contributed 
to stagnation in the sub-sector.  The lesson is clear: giving full ownership of producer 
organizations to members without complementary and enabling regulations, or when 
the potential for information manipulation exists, only creates the illusion of 
empowerment and, as we have seen among Kenya’s coffee cooperatives, can lead to a 
deterioration of members’ welfare. 
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Chapter 4 Appendix 
4.A.1 Defining the Gamma Function 
The gamma function was discovered by Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler (1707-
1783) in his goal to generalize the factorial to non-integer values.  The following 
defines the gamma function: 
For x>0,  ∫
∞ −−=Γ
0
1)( dtetx tx , ∫
∞ −−=Γ′
0
1 )log()( dttetx tx ,   ∫
∞ −−=Γ
0
1 )(log)( dttetx ntxn  
The key functional equation is given by )()1( xxx Γ=+Γ  which allows the 
generalization !)1( xx =+Γ and enables us to differentiate 
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A graphical representation gives a better idea of the shape of the result.  As is clear 
from the Figures 4.9 and 4.10, the function is everywhere negative but asymptotically 
approaching zero in N. 
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Figure 4.9:  Gamma Function Differentiation of ),()0,1( tNZ _ 1 
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Figure 4.10:  Gamma Function Differentiation of ),()0,1( tNZ _ 2 
 
 
Similarly taking the derivative with respect to t yields, 
),()1,0( tNZ = 
       
Figure 4.11 below depicts the result.  In Figure 4.12 we also plot the two dimensional 
plane at N=10 to give a clearer picture of the function’s shape.  We see that the 
function is positive until a certain point at which it becomes negative.  Looking that 
the equation above it is clear that the root is defined by 23
2 −NN  which at N=10 
gives t=0.769 
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